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ABSTRACT 
Community-­‐based	  natural	  resource	  management	  projects	  widely	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  stated	  goals.	  But	  what	  do	  such	  interventions	  and	  policies	  actually	  achieve?	  How	  do	  they	  alter	  the	  practices	  and	  consciousness	  of	  the	  people	  whom	  they	  involve	  in	  management?	  Drawing	  on	  work	  on	  environmentality,	  this	  thesis	  examines	  the	  legacy	  of	  a	  community-­‐based	  natural	  resource	  management	  project	  in	  Kaolack	  Region,	  Senegal.	  Prior	  to	  the	  project,	  residents	  of	  this	  region	  subtlety	  and	  collectively	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  state	  forest	  regulation,	  relying	  on	  widespread	  solidarity	  to	  avoid	  being	  caught	  and	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  forest	  service.	  However,	  this	  situation	  changed	  in	  the	  1990s	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  project	  known	  as	  PAGERNA.	  As	  residents	  became	  implicated	  in	  forest	  management,	  some	  began	  to	  develop	  environmental	  subjectivities:	  new	  ideas	  of	  self-­‐interest	  and	  commitment	  to	  environmental	  protection.	  After	  the	  close	  of	  PAGERNA,	  these	  environmental	  subjectivities	  led	  certain	  residents	  to	  collaborate	  with	  local	  government	  officials	  and	  the	  forest	  service	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  new	  restrictions	  on	  forest	  use.	  Management	  after	  the	  project	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  regime	  of	  “intimate	  government,”	  in	  which	  communities	  regulated	  themselves,	  working	  with	  state	  authorities.	  However,	  not	  all	  rural	  residents	  adopted	  environmentalist	  values.	  Some	  complied	  with	  restrictions	  only	  because	  their	  activities	  were	  closely	  monitored.	  Others,	  residents	  of	  the	  poorest	  villages,	  continued	  to	  resist	  regulation.	  However,	  these	  resistors	  found	  that	  in	  the	  new	  regime	  environmentality	  had	  replaced	  solidarity;	  they	  were	  sanctioned	  by	  village	  guards	  and	  government	  foresters.	  The	  case	  of	  Kaolack	  reveals	  how	  subject	  formation	  shapes	  the	  long-­‐term	  legacy	  of	  natural	  resource	  policies	  and	  projects.	  It	  shows	  how	  management	  systems	  are	  constituted	  by	  multiple	  subjectivities	  and	  how	  rural	  residents	  are	  controlled	  through	  multiple	  mechanisms	  of	  rule.	  The	  thesis	  argues	  that,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  single	  outcomes,	  we	  must	  examine	  heterogeneous	  changes	  in	  people’s	  practices,	  identities,	  and	  relationships	  with	  institutions.	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INTRODUCTION 
Near	  a	  village	  in	  central	  Senegal,	  an	  elderly	  man	  walks	  along	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  sandy	  field,	  along	  a	  line	  of	  gray-­‐green	  ngeer	  bushes.	  He	  hears	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  machete,	  and	  turns	  to	  step	  into	  the	  thicket.	  After	  a	  few	  paces,	  he	  comes	  upon	  a	  young	  man	  in	  a	  surur	  tree,	  a	  pile	  of	  branches	  on	  the	  ground	  below	  him.	  The	  patrolling	  village	  guard	  tells	  the	  young	  woodcutter:	  “Get	  down!	  You	  can’t	  cut	  here.	  Didn’t	  you	  see	  the	  sign	  over	  there?”	  The	  woodcutter	  had	  seen	  the	  sign;	  he	  found	  it	  peculiar,	  but	  hadn’t	  taken	  it	  too	  seriously.	  One	  sees	  all	  kinds	  of	  signs.	  This	  one	  read:	  ‘Àll	  bu	  nuy	  arr.’	  (This	  forest	  is	  being	  protected).	  After	  this	  point	  in	  the	  encounter,	  one	  of	  several	  things	  might	  happen:	  If	  the	  young	  man	  is	  apologetic,	  he	  might	  be	  escorted	  to	  the	  village	  and	  made	  to	  pay	  2	  or	  3	  thousand	  West	  African	  francs	  (fcfa)1	  to	  the	  village	  forest	  protection	  committee.	  If,	  however,	  he	  tries	  to	  run	  away	  or	  quarrel	  with	  the	  guard,	  his	  name	  might	  be	  passed	  to	  the	  district	  forest	  service	  agent.	  The	  agent,	  wearing	  army	  fatigues,	  will	  later	  visit	  the	  woodcutter’s	  home	  to	  issue	  a	  formal	  citation	  and	  levy	  a	  hefty	  fine.2	  The	  tableau	  sketched	  above	  presents	  a	  small,	  local,	  and	  routine	  drama	  that	  has	  become	  common	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  Kaolack,	  Senegal.	  In	  this	  mostly	  agricultural	  region,	  village	  guards	  protect	  ‘forests3’	  that	  occupy	  small	  areas	  and	  make	  only	  small	  contributions	  to	  residents’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Approximately	  4	  to	  6	  U.S.	  dollars.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  500	  fcfa	  equals	  approximately	  1	  U.S.	  dollar.	  
2	  A	  standard	  fine	  for	  a	  minor	  infraction	  like	  lopping	  branches	  can	  range	  from	  15,000	  to	  30,000	  fcfa	  (West	  African	  francs),	  equivalent	  to	  about	  30	  to	  60	  U.S.	  dollars.	  This	  amount	  would	  constitute	  a	  severe	  financial	  strain	  for	  most	  farmers	  in	  Kaolack	  region.	  Many	  would	  need	  to	  sell	  a	  goat	  or	  reduce	  seeds	  and	  fertilizer	  inputs	  in	  the	  following	  agricultural	  season.	  
3	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘forest’	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  non-­‐agricultural	  land-­‐uses,	  and	  to	  vegetation	  including	  trees,	  shrubs,	  grasses	  and,	  at	  times,	  bear	  soil.	  Here	  the	  term	  ‘forest’	  is	  shorthand	  for	  the	  social	  and	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  land	  type	  rather	  than	  a	  characterization	  of	  the	  vegetation	  present	  on	  the	  site	  at	  any	  one	  moment	  in	  time.	  
	   	  	   2	  incomes.	  Much	  social	  science	  research	  on	  environmental	  protection	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  parks	  to	  safeguard	  what	  are	  perceived	  as	  globally	  important	  reserves	  of	  biodiversity	  (i.e.	  Neumann	  1998).	  Much	  has	  also	  been	  said	  about	  organized	  social	  movements	  residents	  mount	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  appropriation	  of	  their	  land	  and	  resources	  for	  conservation	  projects	  (i.e.	  Agrawal	  2005a).	  The	  case	  of	  Kaolack	  is	  substantially	  different.	  The	  ‘forests’	  in	  question	  are	  neither	  important	  in	  biodiversity	  terms,	  nor	  have	  they	  sparked	  public	  confrontations.	  Yet	  to	  the	  actors	  involved	  –	  village	  guards,	  woodcutters,	  and	  other	  rural	  residents	  –	  Kaolack’s	  forests	  represent	  an	  important	  locus	  of	  thought	  and	  action.	  Further,	  villagers’	  efforts	  to	  protect	  forests	  are	  a	  new	  element	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Kaolack,	  and	  set	  the	  region	  apart	  from	  other	  areas	  of	  Senegal.4	  In	  other	  places	  and	  at	  other	  times,	  few	  villagers	  would	  have	  considered	  guarding	  forests,	  or	  reporting	  the	  actions	  of	  neighbors	  or	  relatives	  to	  the	  forest	  service.	  This	  thesis	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  unpack	  changes	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  forests	  catalyzed	  by	  development	  projects	  and	  community-­‐based	  management,	  both	  common	  features	  in	  the	  current	  landscape	  of	  development	  assistance	  in	  Africa.	  However,	  rather	  than	  focus	  on	  the	  immediate	  outcomes	  of	  such	  interventions,	  this	  thesis	  situates	  them	  in	  an	  ongoing	  history	  of	  forest	  governance.	  It	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  actions,	  values,	  and	  identities	  of	  rural	  residents.	  This	  thesis	  examines	  how	  communities	  became	  involved	  in	  forest	  management	  in	  Kaolack	  Region.	  Chapter	  1	  sets	  the	  stage	  by	  introducing	  theories	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  communities	  and	  state	  authority,	  between	  resistance	  and	  incorporation,	  and	  between	  regulatory	  projects	  and	  practices.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  environmentality	  framework	  (Agrawal	  2005a,	  2005b),	  it	  seeks	  to	  a	  conceptual	  middle	  ground	  that	  avoids	  dichotomies	  and	  allows	  exploration	  of	  multiple	  facets	  of	  environmental	  governance	  change.	  Chapter	  2	  describes	  Kaolack	  Region,	  the	  setting	  in	  which	  the	  empirical	  story	  unfolds.	  It	  also	  outlines	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  more	  densely	  forested	  eastern	  regions	  of	  Senegal	  projects	  and	  policies	  have	  excluded	  rural	  residents	  from	  decision	  making	  about	  forest	  management.	  For	  examples	  of	  the	  extensive	  research	  in	  this	  region,	  see	  Ribot	  2001,	  Faye	  2006,	  Bandiaky	  2008.	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  methods	  used	  to	  construct	  this	  story.	  Chapters	  3	  through	  5	  narrate	  the	  story,	  each	  focusing	  on	  one	  period	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Kaolack	  forest	  regulation.	  Chapter	  3	  examines	  the	  situation	  prior	  to	  1990.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  forest	  service	  dominated	  regulation	  of	  Senegal’s	  forests,	  using	  a	  legal	  model	  developed	  by	  the	  French	  colonial	  government.	  However,	  the	  tight	  restrictions	  this	  model	  imposed	  created	  an	  enforcement	  task	  that	  the	  forest	  service	  could	  never	  match.	  Violations	  of	  the	  official	  codes	  were	  rampant,	  and	  villagers	  practiced	  widespread	  and	  subtle	  resistance	  to	  get	  around	  regulations	  and	  reduce	  sanctions.	  Resistance	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  network	  of	  solidarity	  and	  collusion;	  although	  the	  forest	  service	  tried	  to	  encourage	  peasants	  to	  inform	  on	  their	  rule-­‐breaking	  neighbors	  and	  family	  members,	  they	  almost	  never	  did.	  In	  sum,	  the	  forest	  service	  and	  rural	  residents	  were	  locked	  in	  a	  stalemate	  over	  forest	  regulation.	  Chapter	  4	  describes	  how	  this	  stalemate	  was	  broken	  in	  the	  1990s,	  when	  the	  PAGERNA	  development	  project	  sought	  to	  establish	  community-­‐based	  forest	  management	  in	  many	  districts	  in	  Kaolack.	  PAGERNA	  designated	  village-­‐based	  committees	  and	  guards	  to	  regulate	  small	  areas	  of	  protected	  forest.	  It	  created	  new	  territories	  on	  the	  landscape,	  as	  resources	  that	  were	  once	  open-­‐access	  became	  commons	  held	  by	  individual	  villages.	  Further,	  community-­‐based	  management	  entailed	  changes	  not	  just	  in	  institutions,	  but	  also	  in	  people’s	  identities.	  Some	  villagers,	  through	  their	  involvement	  in	  monitoring	  forests	  and	  enforcing	  rules,	  began	  to	  think	  about	  the	  environment	  in	  a	  new	  way:	  they	  came	  to	  see	  forest	  resources	  as	  a	  common	  good	  that	  needed	  protection.	  In	  other	  words,	  participation	  in	  forest	  regulation	  produced	  new	  environmental	  subjectivities.	  Chapter	  5	  focuses	  on	  the	  legacy	  PAGERNA	  left	  behind	  after	  its	  close.	  No	  longer	  supported	  by	  project	  activities,	  village	  leaders	  did	  not	  abandon	  regulation,	  nor	  did	  they	  struggle	  for	  authority	  with	  the	  forest	  service.	  Instead,	  they	  developed	  collaborative	  relationships	  with	  foresters.	  Their	  cooperation	  established	  a	  governance	  regime	  that	  regulated	  forests	  more	  effectively	  and	  more	  strictly	  than	  before,	  a	  regime	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  ‘intimate	  government,’	  following	  Arun	  Agrawal	  (2005a,	  2005b).	  Yet	  intimate	  government	  in	  Kaolack	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  residents	  were	  involved	  in	  regulation	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  While	  some	  residents	  developed	  environmental	  subjectivities,	  the	  majority	  complied	  with	  regulations	  not	  because	  of	  environmental	  commitments	  but	  because	  they	  were	  being	  watched	  by	  their	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  neighbors	  and	  relatives.	  A	  third	  group	  of	  residents,	  located	  in	  poor	  villages,	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  regulation	  entirely.	  They	  continued	  to	  resist	  regulation	  and	  to	  use	  forest	  resources	  to	  meet	  household	  needs.	  However,	  environmental	  subjectivities	  had	  eroded	  the	  solidarity	  between	  villages	  that	  had	  previously	  helped	  these	  resistors	  avoid	  sanctions.	  They	  were	  thus	  persecuted	  by	  guards	  in	  neighboring	  villagers,	  local	  government,	  and	  the	  forest	  service	  alike.	  Intimate	  government	  thus	  made	  forest	  regulation	  more	  effective,	  strict,	  and	  consistent,	  undermining	  the	  everyday	  resistance	  strategies	  of	  the	  poor.	  Far	  from	  producing	  a	  single	  outcome,	  therefore,	  intimate	  government	  entailed	  multiple	  subjectivities	  and	  modalities	  of	  power.	  The	  thesis	  concludes	  by	  examining	  the	  importance	  of	  environmental	  subjectivities	  to	  understanding	  changing	  governance	  of	  natural	  resources.	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1. COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE LONG TERM 
A	  large	  and	  interdisciplinary	  literature	  examines	  the	  various	  ways	  communities	  are	  implicated	  in	  formal	  environmental	  management	  in	  developing	  countries.5	  Over	  the	  past	  30	  years,	  this	  literature	  has	  cast	  a	  critical	  eye	  on	  trends	  in	  international	  development	  towards	  community-­‐based,	  participatory,	  and	  decentralization	  approaches	  to	  natural	  resource	  management.	  It	  has	  made	  one	  point	  abundantly	  clear:	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  community-­‐based	  management	  fails	  to	  achieve	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  goals	  set	  forth	  for	  it	  (Brosius	  et	  al	  1998,	  Agrawal	  and	  Gibson	  1999,	  Kellert	  et	  al	  2000).	  For	  example,	  community-­‐based	  initiatives	  have	  failed	  to	  devolve	  real	  powers	  to	  local	  authorities	  (Schroeder	  1999),	  or	  have	  devolved	  powers	  to	  institutions	  that	  are	  not	  representative	  of	  nor	  accountable	  to	  rural	  populations	  (Ribot	  2007).	  One	  strand	  of	  community-­‐based	  initiatives	  includes	  those	  that	  are	  propagated	  by	  donor-­‐funded	  development	  project	  structures.	  In	  West	  Africa,	  despite	  legal	  reforms	  promoting	  decentralization	  in	  some	  countries	  (Ribot	  1999b,	  Post	  and	  Snel	  2003),	  development	  projects	  remain	  the	  dominant	  means	  through	  which	  change	  actually	  occurs	  in	  practice	  (e.g.	  Ribot	  2009a;	  Gray	  2006).	  Project-­‐based	  approaches	  have	  been	  criticized	  because	  they	  may	  fail	  to	  generate	  lasting	  institutional	  change	  on	  the	  ground	  (Manor	  2004,	  Poteete	  and	  Ribot	  2011)	  or	  produce	  change	  that	  promotes	  clientalistic	  relationships	  (Blundo	  1995).	  Much	  critical	  research	  has	  thus	  diagnosed	  what	  community-­‐based	  management	  has	  failed	  to	  achieve.	  Yet	  a	  complementary	  question	  can	  be	  posed:	  What	  have	  such	  projects	  actually	  achieved,	  regardless	  of	  their	  stated	  intentions?	  Whether	  they	  achieve	  (or	  even	  attempt	  to	  achieve)	  their	  goals,	  many	  community-­‐based	  natural	  resource	  management	  projects	  have	  lasting	  effects	  on	  the	  course	  of	  governance.	  The	  lasting	  impacts	  of	  community-­‐based	  projects	  have	  been	  examined	  through	  diverse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  a	  recent	  review	  of	  the	  various	  literature	  on	  community-­‐based,	  participatory,	  and	  decentralized	  management,	  see	  Tole	  (2010).	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  theoretical	  lenses,	  often	  focusing	  on	  how	  they	  have	  led	  to	  redistributions	  of	  power	  within	  communities.	  Community-­‐based	  management	  has	  lead	  to	  elite	  capture	  of	  institutions	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  (Gray	  2006),	  women	  (Bandiaky	  2008),	  or	  marginalized	  communities	  (Sivaramakrishnan	  2000).	  Other	  work	  has	  examined	  community-­‐based	  interventions	  through	  a	  historical	  lens,	  showing	  how	  the	  places	  they	  implicate	  are	  not	  blank	  slates,	  nor	  vessels	  for	  timeless	  indigenous	  systems	  for	  protecting	  nature	  (Agrawal	  and	  Gibson	  1999).	  By	  setting	  community-­‐based	  management	  in	  historical	  context,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  interventions	  are	  part	  of	  long-­‐term,	  ongoing	  histories	  of	  governance	  change.	  Rather	  than	  occurring	  outside	  existing	  centralized	  management,	  community-­‐based	  regimes	  draw	  upon,	  compete	  with,	  and	  connect	  with	  state	  institutions	  in	  complex	  ways.	  Further,	  community-­‐based	  management	  does	  not	  have	  the	  last	  word:	  governance	  continues	  to	  evolve	  after	  the	  interventions	  that	  create	  community	  institutions.	  This	  historical	  perspective	  has	  been	  advanced	  in	  frameworks	  that	  make	  changing	  governance	  the	  heart	  of	  analysis.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  three	  research	  areas	  that	  examine	  processes	  of	  long	  term	  and	  systemic	  governance	  change.	  	  
Environmentality and Subject Formation 
In	  his	  book	  Environmentality,	  Arun	  Agrawal	  contributes	  a	  sweepingly	  integrative	  framework	  to	  the	  study	  of	  changing	  natural	  resource	  governance,	  interrelating	  work	  on	  decentralization,	  community	  politics,	  and	  subject	  formation	  (2005a,	  2005b).	  Drawing	  on	  and	  modifying	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  governmentality	  (1991),	  as	  well	  as	  subsequent	  work	  (e.g.	  Dean	  2010	  [1999]),	  Agrawal	  defines	  environmentality	  as	  “the	  knowledge,	  politics,	  institutions,	  and	  subjectivities	  that	  come	  to	  be	  linked	  together	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  a	  domain	  that	  requires	  regulation	  and	  protection”	  (2005a,	  p.	  226).	  Drawing	  evidence	  from	  a	  100-­‐year	  history	  of	  forest	  management	  in	  Kumaon,	  India,	  Agrawal	  traces	  how	  the	  colonial	  Indian	  forest	  service,	  faced	  with	  fierce	  and	  widespread	  protest	  and	  resistance	  to	  its	  regulations,	  established	  a	  decentralized	  system	  of	  village	  forest	  councils.	  He	  defines	  three	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  that	  link	  the	  forest	  service,	  village	  councils,	  and	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  local	  residents,	  and	  labels	  them,	  respectively:	  ‘governmentalized	  localities,’	  ‘regulatory	  communities,’	  and	  ‘environmental	  subjectivities.’	  The	  first	  relationship	  describes	  the	  institutional	  structure	  through	  which	  village	  councils	  were	  bound	  to	  forestry	  administrators	  in	  a	  way	  that	  encouraged	  them	  to	  implement	  the	  forest	  service’s	  regulatory	  agenda.	  The	  second	  relationship,	  ‘regulatory	  communities,’	  identifies	  how	  village	  councils	  regulated	  the	  forest	  use	  activities	  of	  local	  residents,	  producing	  more	  effective	  and	  precise	  monitoring	  and	  sanctioning.	  This	  framing	  draws	  on	  Foucault’s	  classic	  analysis	  of	  surveillance	  and	  self-­‐regulation	  (1977).	  Finally,	  in	  ‘environmental	  subjectivities,’	  Agrawal	  argues	  that	  local	  residents	  themselves	  became	  implicated	  in	  forest	  governance.	  As	  they	  participated	  in	  regulatory	  practices,	  villagers	  began	  to	  think	  about	  their	  relationship	  to	  forests	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  They	  came	  to	  think	  and	  act	  as	  ‘environmental	  subjects’	  and	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  support	  forest	  regulation.	  The	  above	  three	  relationships	  are	  linked	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘intimate	  government,’	  which	  describes	  a	  form	  of	  governance	  in	  which	  state	  bureaucracies,	  local	  authorities,	  and	  rural	  residents	  collaborate	  on	  the	  project	  of	  forest	  regulation.	  Although	  he	  never	  defines	  the	  term	  explicitly,	  Agrawal	  characterizes	  how	  it	  functions:	  Intimate	   government	   in	   Kumaon	   works	   by	   dispersing	   rule,	   scattering	  involvement	  in	  government	  more	  widely,	  and	  encouraging	  careful	  reckoning	  of	   environmental	   practices	   and	   their	   consequences	   among	   Kumaon’s	  residents.	   Actors	   in	   numerous	   locations	   of	   environmental	   decision	  making	  work	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  to	  different	  degrees	  to	  protect	  forests	  (2005b,	  p.	  178).	  He	  contrasts	  intimate	  government	  with	  “government	  at	  a	  distance,”	  which	  involves	  homogenizing	  institutions,	  social	  relations,	  and	  knowledge	  across	  space	  to	  facilitate	  centralized	  rule.	  In	  intimate	  government,	  the	  state	  channels	  pre-­‐existing	  power	  relationships	  in	  communities	  toward	  new	  ends,	  such	  as	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment	  (2005b,	  p.	  179).	  In	  this	  respect,	  intimate	  government	  knits	  together	  the	  three	  components	  of	  the	  environmental	  framework.	  It	  shows	  how	  the	  state	  project	  of	  regulating	  forests	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  through	  communities	  (governmentalized	  localities)	  was	  dependent	  on	  community-­‐level	  politics	  (regulatory	  communities)	  and	  self-­‐regulating	  subjects	  (environmental	  subjectivities).	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  and	  interrogate	  intimate	  government	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  changing	  regulation	  and	  subjectivities	  in	  Kaolack.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  must	  first	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  Agrawal’s	  analysis	  of	  environmental	  subjectivities.	  The	  emergence	  of	  environmental	  subjects	  is	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  Agrawal’s	  analysis	  of	  intimate	  government.	  Environmental	  subjects	  are	  people	  who	  “come	  to	  care	  for,	  act,	  and	  think	  of	  their	  actions	  in	  relation	  to	  something	  they	  define	  as	  the	  environment”	  (2005a,	  p.	  164).	  Agrawal	  traces	  how	  residents	  who	  at	  one	  time	  opposed	  or	  resisted	  forest	  protection	  became	  supporters	  and	  participants,	  and	  even	  demanded	  more	  regulation	  than	  state	  authorities	  had	  been	  able	  to	  provide	  (Agrawal	  2005b,	  p.	  171).	  Controversially,	  he	  argues	  that	  whether	  a	  person	  became	  an	  environmental	  subject	  was	  not	  driven	  by	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  social	  identities	  based	  on	  class,	  gender,	  or	  caste	  group.	  Instead,	  the	  type	  and	  intensity	  of	  participation	  in	  daily	  regulatory	  practices	  (such	  as	  elections,	  forest	  monitoring,	  and	  financial	  contributions)	  shaped	  the	  environmental	  subjectivities	  people	  developed.	  Rather	  than	  environmental	  values	  convincing	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  regulation,	  it	  was	  participation	  that	  led	  people	  to	  develop	  these	  values.	  They	  did	  so	  by	  coming	  to	  see	  forests	  as	  important	  contributors	  to	  individual	  and	  collective	  self-­‐interest	  (2005b).	  In	  this	  regard,	  Agrawal’s	  findings	  are	  not	  anomalous;	  others	  have	  also	  found	  that	  ideological	  and	  cultural	  factors	  may	  be	  more	  important	  than	  structural	  position	  in	  explaining	  political	  orientations	  and	  behaviors.	  Dennis	  Galvan	  (2004)	  proposes	  a	  process	  through	  which	  opportunistic	  engagement	  with	  a	  new	  ideology	  alters	  people’s	  sense	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  While	  people	  may	  initially	  adopt	  individual	  elements	  of	  novel	  value	  systems	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  existing	  conception	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  over	  time	  they	  find	  themselves	  enmeshed	  in	  the	  system’s	  cohesive	  logic	  and	  begin	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  change	  how	  they	  think	  of	  self-­‐interest	  (p.	  103).	  While	  Agrawal	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  participation	  in	  altering	  subjectivities,	  he	  also	  admits	  that	  structural	  location	  shapes	  who	  is	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Agrawal	  2005b,	  p.	  166).	  Yet,	  although	  Agrawal	  acknowledges	  the	  possibility	  that	  intimate	  government	  may	  produce	  different	  kinds	  of	  subjectivities,	  it	  is	  not	  where	  his	  focus	  lies	  (Mawdsley	  2009).	  
	   	  	   9	  By	  the	  end	  of	  Agrawal’s	  account,	  the	  reader	  is	  left	  with	  the	  impression	  that	  community-­‐based	  management	  has	  sunk	  roots	  to	  the	  depths	  of	  Kumaoni	  village	  society.	  Village	  councils	  and	  environmental	  subjects	  are	  ubiquitous	  and	  incorporated	  into	  a	  project	  of	  forest	  regulation	  that	  was	  designed	  by	  the	  state.	  Yet	  Agrawal’s	  story	  also	  reveals	  traces	  of	  non-­‐participation.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  many	  villages,	  forest	  councils	  never	  existed	  or	  have	  gone	  defunct.	  Even	  in	  villages	  where	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  are	  strongest,	  residents	  regularly	  break	  the	  rules	  (2005a,	  p.	  151-­‐2).	  Furthermore,	  the	  conditions	  that	  the	  forest	  service	  imposes	  are	  in	  many	  cases	  so	  strict	  as	  to	  be	  unimplementable.6	  Thus,	  despite	  their	  best	  efforts,	  village	  forest	  councils	  find	  themselves	  unable	  to	  extinguish	  illegal	  activities	  (2005b,	  p.	  171).	  Although	  the	  devolution	  of	  forestry	  regulation	  to	  village	  councils	  in	  Kumaon	  was	  able	  to	  overcome	  organized,	  inter-­‐village	  protests,	  it	  has	  been	  less	  effective	  at	  countering	  another	  form	  of	  resistance:	  one	  that	  is	  dispersed,	  individual,	  and	  difficult	  for	  authorities	  to	  detect.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  classic	  accounts	  of	  such	  everyday	  forms	  of	  resistance.	  	  
Resistance and Hegemony 
In	  his	  classic	  book	  Weapons	  of	  the	  Weak,	  James	  C.	  Scott	  describes	  a	  set	  of	  strategies	  used	  by	  subordinate	  groups	  to	  resist	  domination	  and	  appropriation	  by	  elites	  (1985).	  Collectively,	  these	  strategies	  constitute	  what	  he	  calls	  “everyday	  forms	  of	  resistance.”	  Drawing	  on	  in-­‐depth	  ethnographic	  fieldwork	  in	  Malaysia,	  he	  catalogues	  a	  host	  of	  everyday	  resistance	  practices,	  including	  poaching,	  foot-­‐dragging,	  under-­‐delivering,	  hiding,	  and	  flight.	  What	  is	  characteristic	  about	  these	  practices	  is	  that	  they	  inhibit	  and	  interfere	  with	  exploitative	  production	  arrangements	  and	  oppressive	  policies	  without	  challenging	  the	  dominant	  ideological	  framework.	  Everyday	  resistance	  is	  small-­‐scale,	  off-­‐the-­‐books,	  and	  difficult	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  For	  example,	  the	  provision	  that	  councils	  must	  collect	  the	  signatures	  of	  three	  forestry	  administrators	  before	  harvesting	  more	  than	  one	  tree	  per	  year	  (Agrawal	  2005a,	  p.	  117).	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  states	  to	  monitor.	  The	  poor	  must	  resist	  in	  these	  hidden	  ways	  because	  they	  can	  ill	  afford	  the	  backlash	  that	  states	  and	  elites	  mete	  out	  in	  response	  to	  overt	  political	  action.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  everyday	  resistance	  is	  purely	  individual	  and	  atomized;	  indeed,	  it	  is	  successful	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  practiced	  ubiquitously	  by	  laborers	  and	  peasants,	  and	  backed	  by	  informally	  organized	  collusion.	  But	  what	  makes	  widespread	  collusion	  possible	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  formal	  organization?	  Scott	  seeks	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  in	  Domination	  and	  the	  
Arts	  of	  Resistance	  (1990).	  He	  argues	  that	  subordinates’	  acts	  of	  resistance	  are	  based	  on	  shared	  ideologies,	  which	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘hidden	  transcript.’	  While	  subordinates	  may	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  dominant	  ideologies	  in	  public	  settings,	  Scott	  insists	  they	  never	  genuinely	  accept	  them.	  Behind	  the	  scenes	  they	  mock	  elites	  and	  celebrate	  rule-­‐breakers.	  While	  extremely	  violent	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  means	  of	  dominance	  (i.e.	  slavery,	  total	  institutions,	  etc.)	  can	  drive	  the	  hidden	  transcript	  deep	  underground,	  they	  can	  never	  completely	  extinguish	  it.	  Scott’s	  provocative	  analysis	  sparked	  diverse	  debates	  over	  the	  strength	  and	  limits	  of	  ideological	  hegemony,	  resistance	  practices,	  and	  subordinate	  consciousness	  (e.g.	  Ortner	  1995,	  Neumann	  1998,	  Greenhouse	  2005,	  Sivaramakrishnan	  2005,	  Homes	  2007).	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  makes	  a	  particularly	  well-­‐developed	  case	  against	  Scott’s	  framework	  (1990).	  Following	  a	  governmentality	  logic,	  Mitchell	  argues	  that	  Scott	  creates	  an	  illusory	  autonomous	  realm	  of	  resistance	  for	  peasants	  by	  excluding	  from	  consideration	  precisely	  the	  forms	  of	  domination	  which	  everyday	  resistance	  cannot	  offset.	  He	  argues	  that	  domination	  can	  define	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  possible	  for	  subordinates,	  and	  can	  generate	  subjects	  that	  act	  autonomously	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reproduces	  the	  structure	  of	  domination.	  Mitchell’s	  and	  others’	  work	  on	  subject	  formation	  (Galvan	  2004;	  Agrawal	  2005a,	  2005b;	  Snodgrass	  2008)	  exists	  in	  tension	  with	  Scott’s	  position	  on	  the	  hidden	  transcript.	  Yet	  this	  tension	  can	  be	  partially	  resolved	  by	  recognizing	  that	  “subordinates”	  encompass	  multiple	  identities	  and	  subject	  positions	  (Ortner	  1995).	  These	  positionalities	  provide	  different	  opportunities	  and	  consequences	  for	  both	  incorporation	  and	  resistance.	  Thus,	  we	  must	  look	  closely	  at	  particular	  empirical	  contexts	  and	  places	  to	  understand	  who	  becomes	  incorporated	  into	  projects	  of	  government,	  and	  in	  which	  partial	  and	  limited	  ways.	  A	  detailed,	  pluralist	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  approach	  draws	  our	  attention	  not	  merely	  to	  lofty	  projects	  of	  rule,	  but	  to	  the	  messy	  contextualized	  ground	  where	  these	  projects	  take	  shape.	  
	  
Governance “as it is”7: Corruption and Syncretism  
Governance	  “as	  it	  is”	  in	  real	  places	  -­‐	  be	  these	  offices	  of	  government	  bureaucracies	  or	  meetings	  in	  village	  squares	  -­‐	  differs	  starkly	  from	  the	  ways	  it	  is	  characterized	  by	  government	  planners	  or	  governmentality	  theorists.	  In	  practice,	  attempts	  to	  incorporate	  people	  in	  their	  own	  subjugation	  (as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  resist	  such	  projects)	  are	  incomplete,	  contingent,	  and	  context-­‐specific	  (Li	  2007).	  The	  processes	  through	  which	  people	  in	  particular	  places	  alter	  laws	  and	  institutions	  to	  produce	  governance-­‐as-­‐it-­‐is	  are	  thus	  a	  critical	  piece	  of	  long-­‐term	  change.	  This	  section	  considers	  two	  areas	  in	  which	  complex,	  local	  governance	  practices	  have	  been	  studied.	  The	  first	  area	  of	  work,	  focusing	  on	  everyday	  corruption,	  considers	  informalization	  of	  formal	  procedures	  in	  government	  bureaucracies	  providing	  public	  services.	  The	  second	  area,	  labeled	  institutional	  syncretism,	  is	  broader.	  It	  considers	  how	  historical	  memory	  and	  institutional	  experience	  together	  influence	  people’s	  creative	  attempts	  to	  alter	  institutions.	  In	  one	  sense,	  corruption	  is	  ubiquitous.	  Laws	  and	  regulations,	  no	  matter	  how	  detailed	  or	  comprehensive,	  never	  fully	  determine	  the	  interactions	  and	  practices	  through	  which	  they	  operate	  in	  concrete	  local	  settings.8	  Some	  observers	  describe	  the	  disconnect	  between	  law	  and	  practice	  as	  ‘corruption’	  without	  intending	  to	  pass	  judgment	  on	  the	  (un)desirability	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  practices	  encompassed	  by	  this	  term.	  They	  have	  sought	  to	  re-­‐think	  corruption	  in	  ways	  that	  go	  beyond	  previous	  conceptions	  that	  focused	  on	  what	  it	  was	  not,	  i.e.	  ‘corruption	  is	  not	  good	  governance’	  or	  ‘corruption	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  strong	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  I	  derive	  this	  term	  from	  Paul	  Robbins’	  discussion	  of	  “institutions	  as	  they	  are”	  (2005).	  
8	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  Africanist	  literature	  on	  corruption,	  see	  Blundo	  (2006b).	  
	   	  	   12	  institutions.’	  Instead,	  these	  scholars	  view	  corruption	  as	  governance	  “for	  real”	  (Blundo	  and	  de	  Sardin	  2006a,	  Blundo	  and	  Le	  Meur	  2009)	  or	  “as	  it	  is”	  (Robbins	  2000,	  Robbins	  et	  al	  2009).	  Like	  the	  research	  on	  community-­‐based	  natural	  resource	  management	  described	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  recent	  studies	  of	  corruption	  focus	  on	  what	  corruption	  does	  achieve.	  Results	  indicate	  that	  corruption	  has	  heterogeneous	  impacts.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  natural	  resource	  management,	  it	  can	  undermine	  pro-­‐poor	  formal	  procedures	  (Robbins	  2000)	  or	  can	  allow	  the	  poor	  to	  access	  needed	  resources	  through	  bribes	  that	  are	  less	  costly	  than	  official	  access	  fees	  (see	  Chapter	  3,	  below).	  Corruption	  can	  also	  allow	  for	  greater	  flexibility	  than	  formal	  rules	  when	  dealing	  with	  diverse	  user	  groups	  and	  non-­‐equilibrium	  environments	  (Robbins	  et	  al	  2009).	  Since	  its	  impacts	  are	  so	  diverse,	  understanding	  its	  implications	  requires	  careful	  examination	  of	  official	  procedures,	  daily	  practices,	  and	  the	  wider	  field	  of	  social	  relations	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded	  (Blundo	  et	  de	  Sardin	  2006b,	  p.	  81).	  Again,	  contextualized	  empirical	  research	  is	  required	  to	  understand	  how	  official	  projects	  deviate	  from	  formal	  accounts,	  what	  drives	  such	  deviations,	  and	  what	  implications	  they	  hold	  for	  governance	  regimes.	  An	  empirically-­‐based	  perspective	  on	  how	  formal	  institutions	  are	  modified	  in	  practice	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  connected	  to	  other	  broad,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  approaches	  to	  institutional	  change.	  	  Institutional	  syncretism	  offers	  a	  second	  expansive	  and	  flexible	  framework	  for	  understanding	  governance-­‐as-­‐it-­‐is.	  The	  syncretism	  framework	  examines	  institutions	  as	  combinations	  of	  features	  from	  different	  social-­‐historical	  settings,	  including	  rules,	  norms,	  and	  historical	  memories	  (Galvan	  and	  Marcus	  2003,	  Galvan	  2004,	  Galvan	  and	  Sil	  2007,	  Galvan	  2007).	  Syncretism	  examines	  how	  people	  creatively	  engage	  with	  and	  modify	  institutions	  originating	  in	  other	  settings.	  To	  modify	  imported	  institutions,	  syncretism	  holds,	  people	  draw	  on	  their	  experiences	  of	  past	  institutions,	  social	  relations,	  and	  historical	  memories.	  Engagement	  with	  imported	  institutions	  can	  in	  turn	  alter	  people’s	  understandings	  of	  their	  own	  experiences	  and	  histories.	  Rather	  than	  combining	  stable,	  discrete	  pieces,	  syncretism	  entails	  mixing	  elements	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  contestation	  and	  multiple	  interpretations	  even	  within	  the	  social	  setting	  in	  which	  they	  developed.	  The	  hypothesis	  underlying	  the	  syncretism	  approach	  is	  “that	  syncretic	  institutions,	  whether	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  deliberately	  engineered	  from	  above	  or	  emerging	  through	  incrementally	  altered	  practices	  from	  below,	  will	  generate	  more	  viable,	  durable,	  and	  legitimate	  institutions	  over	  the	  long	  run	  than…	  borrowed	  or	  imposed	  institutions…	  without	  significant	  modification	  (Galvan	  and	  Sil	  2007,	  p.	  9).	  Adopting	  a	  more	  normative	  stance	  in	  other	  discussions,	  some	  authors	  propose	  that	  syncretism	  is	  more	  complete	  and	  viable	  when	  non-­‐elites	  have	  the	  discretion	  to	  modify	  the	  full	  range	  of	  institutional	  elements,	  rather	  than	  being	  restricted	  to	  only	  formal	  procedures	  (Galvan	  and	  and	  Marcus	  2003).	  These	  hypotheses	  aside,	  syncretism	  describes	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  institutions	  are	  formed,	  rather	  than	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  processes.	  Syncretic	  institutions	  will	  not	  necessarily	  function	  under	  logics	  of	  legal-­‐rationalism,	  democratic	  representativeness,	  or	  transparency.	  The	  frameworks’	  authors	  propose,	  however,	  that	  they	  may	  establish	  durable	  collaborations	  between	  state	  and	  local	  actors	  based	  on	  new	  and	  hybridized	  procedures,	  rules-­‐in-­‐practice,	  and	  values	  (Galvan	  and	  Marcus	  2003,	  p.	  140).	  	  	  
Environmentality as Middle Ground 
By	  connecting	  the	  disparate	  frameworks	  described	  above,	  I	  intend	  to	  frame	  a	  middle	  ground	  in	  which	  to	  explore	  changing	  relationships	  between	  state	  institutions	  and	  rural	  residents	  in	  environmental	  governance.	  I	  follow	  governmentality	  scholars	  in	  attempting	  to	  avoid	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  ideological	  hegemony	  and	  resistance	  (Foucault	  1977).	  However,	  I	  diverge	  from	  some	  studies	  (e.g.	  Mitchell	  1990)	  by	  proposing	  that	  hegemony	  and	  resistance	  can	  be	  analytically	  useful	  as	  separate	  categories.	  I	  do	  not	  insist	  that	  these	  processes	  necessarily	  operate	  simultaneously,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  a	  singular	  movement	  of	  power.	  Similarly,	  I	  avoid	  asking	  whether	  resistance	  is	  always	  possible,	  and	  whether	  hegemony	  always	  operates.	  Instead,	  I	  start	  with	  the	  assumptions	  that	  involvement	  in	  practices	  of	  rule	  sometimes	  shapes	  people’s	  thoughts	  and	  identities	  and	  that	  subordinate	  groups	  sometimes	  resist	  domination	  in	  practice	  and	  consciousness.	  Rather	  than	  the	  totalizing	  logic	  of	  ‘projects	  of	  rule,’	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  incomplete	  and	  contingent	  ways	  these	  projects	  are	  manifest	  in	  practice.	  	  
	   	  	   14	  Like	  Agrawal	  (2005a),	  I	  focus	  on	  how	  environmental	  subjectivities	  vary	  across	  people	  who	  are	  located	  in	  different	  social	  positions	  and	  involved	  in	  regulation	  in	  different	  ways.	  However,	  I	  operationalize	  this	  focus	  differently.	  While	  Agrawal	  uses	  survey	  methods	  that	  measure	  the	  degree	  of	  support	  people	  express	  for	  environmental	  protection,9	  I	  use	  an	  ethnographic	  approach	  to	  identify	  multiple	  dimensions	  to	  environmental	  subjectivities.	  Especially	  important	  are	  the	  ways	  people	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  with	  institutions:	  in	  other	  words,	  their	  position	  and	  participation	  in	  a	  regime	  of	  governance.	  Furthermore,	  focusing	  on	  governance-­‐as-­‐it-­‐is,	  I	  seek	  to	  understand	  how	  centralized	  attempts	  to	  create	  subjects	  are	  partial	  and	  contingent,	  resulting	  in	  diverse,	  incomplete,	  or	  even	  contradictory	  subjectivities	  across	  (and	  even	  within)	  individuals.	  A	  focus	  on	  multiple	  subjectivities	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  precise	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  outcomes	  of	  subject	  formation.	  Furthermore,	  this	  focus	  reveals	  how	  certain	  forms	  of	  resistance	  can	  continue	  even	  as	  environmental	  regulation	  becomes	  dispersed	  and	  internalized,	  a	  question	  not	  addressed	  by	  Agrawal.	  Finally,	  syncretism	  and	  governance-­‐as-­‐it-­‐is	  draw	  attention	  to	  how	  people	  draw	  on	  multiple	  subjectivities	  to	  engage	  and	  reshape	  institutions,	  further	  contributing	  to	  the	  contingent	  and	  context-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  governance.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  endeavor	  to	  show	  how	  intimate	  government	  is	  possible	  in	  a	  middle-­‐ground	  of	  partial	  resistance	  and	  partial	  subject	  formation.	  	  The	  three	  frameworks	  discussed	  above	  direct	  attention	  to	  the	  interactions	  of	  material	  and	  ideological	  processes,	  as	  well	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  ‘state,’	  ‘civil	  society,’	  and	  ‘communities.’	  They	  remind	  us	  that	  governance	  encompasses	  not	  only	  official	  procedures	  and	  projects,	  but	  also	  the	  contingent	  and	  informalized	  practices	  through	  which	  actors	  modify	  and	  apply	  these	  projects.	  In	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  that	  follows,	  I	  draw	  on	  Agrawal’s	  concept	  of	  intimate	  government	  to	  describe	  a	  form	  of	  rule	  characterized	  by	  dispersed	  authority	  and	  sustained	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Agrawal	  uses	  interval	  variables	  to	  measure	  individuals’	  support	  for	  environmental	  protection	  and	  willingness	  to	  contribute	  to	  management	  institutions.	  Galvan	  (2004)	  similarly	  uses	  an	  index	  of	  syncretic	  orientations,	  composed	  of	  four	  locally-­‐meaningful	  rank	  variables.	  
	   	  	   15	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  different	  subjectivities	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  incorporation.	  I	  interrogate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  intimate	  government	  Agrawal	  describes	  in	  Kumaon	  may	  apply	  in	  Kaolack,	  a	  place	  characterized	  by	  very	  different	  landscapes,	  people,	  and	  institutions.	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2. BACKGROUND 
This	  background	  chapter	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  analytic	  story	  to	  come.	  It	  first	  outlines	  the	  research	  methods	  used	  to	  examine	  changing	  governance	  of	  forests	  in	  Kaolack.	  Next,	  it	  briefly	  describes	  Senegal’s	  national	  decentralization	  laws,	  which	  frame	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  forest	  service,	  rural	  residents,	  and	  development	  projects.	  Finally,	  it	  sketches	  the	  historical,	  biophysical,	  and	  political	  economic	  setting	  of	  Kaolack	  Region,	  and	  anticipates	  how	  this	  context	  shapes	  the	  story	  of	  community-­‐based	  forest	  management.	  	  
Research Methods 
The	  story	  presented	  here	  is	  based	  on	  fieldwork	  I	  conducted	  in	  Kaolack	  Region,	  Senegal	  between	  May	  and	  December	  2011.	  Over	  this	  period	  I	  undertook	  repeated,	  extended	  stays	  in	  villages	  in	  three	  rural	  districts.	  During	  these	  visits,	  I	  observed	  at	  and	  participated	  in	  forest	  monitoring	  and	  forest	  use,	  rural	  council	  meetings,	  and	  daily	  household	  activities.	  Furthermore,	  I	  conducted	  97	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  informants,	  strategically	  selected	  across	  social	  categories	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  a	  diversity	  of	  viewpoints	  on	  forest	  management	  practices	  and	  institutions	  (Table	  1).	  I	  made	  a	  conscious	  effort	  to	  speak	  with	  not	  only	  residents	  who	  were	  active	  in	  forest	  regulation,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  participated	  little	  and	  had	  less	  interest	  in	  it.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  working	  in	  villages,	  I	  undertook	  observations	  of	  two	  environment-­‐focused	  non-­‐government	  organizations.	  During	  this	  time,	  I	  observed	  and	  participated	  in	  office	  work	  and	  field	  visits,	  interviewed	  staff,	  and	  consulted	  the	  organizations’	  records	  and	  archives.	  Observing	  this	  context	  allowed	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  assumptions,	  motives,	  relationships,	  and	  tools	  employed	  by	  development	  projects	  working	  on	  natural	  resource	  management.	  Since	  the	  organizations	  I	  observed	  existed	  in	  a	  similar	  context	  to	  PAGERNA	  (and	  in	  fact	  employed	  several	  former	  PAGERNA	  staff)	  I	  used	  these	  observations	  to	  make	  informed	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  hypotheses	  about	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  PAGERNA	  project	  under	  study	  here.	  I	  also	  sought	  out	  and	  interviewed	  former	  PAGERNA	  staff	  in	  order	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  project’s	  history.	  In	  addition	  to	  residents	  and	  NGOs,	  I	  also	  studied	  the	  Senegalese	  forest	  service.	  I	  interviewed	  9	  forest	  service	  employees	  at	  diverse	  levels	  in	  the	  hierarchy:	  rural-­‐based	  agents	  in	  3	  districts,	  departmental	  officers,	  staff	  of	  the	  regional	  forestry	  office,	  and	  several	  staff	  at	  the	  national	  direction.	  I	  sought	  to	  understand	  administrators’	  and	  local	  agents’	  perspectives	  on	  specific	  project	  activities	  and	  on	  community-­‐based	  forest	  management	  in	  general;	  as	  well	  as	  to	  understand	  their	  practices	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  work.	  To	  complement	  and	  contextualize	  interview	  and	  observation	  data,	  I	  consulted	  records	  and	  archives	  in	  several	  locations.	  I	  conducted	  a	  quick	  review	  of	  reports	  and	  evaluations	  of	  past	  forestry	  projects	  held	  in	  the	  archives	  of	  the	  Centre	  Forestièr	  de	  Recyclage	  à	  Thies,	  which	  provided	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	  the	  history	  of	  forestry	  projects	  in	  Kaolack	  and	  Senegal	  since	  the	  1970s,	  and	  allowed	  comparison	  of	  the	  project	  considered	  in	  this	  thesis	  with	  others.	  In	  addition,	  I	  examined	  records	  of	  forestry	  infractions	  and	  sanctions	  at	  several	  forestry	  offices.	  I	  also	  studied	  the	  records	  of	  one	  rural	  council,	  and	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  written	  records	  kept	  by	  village	  forest	  guards	  wherever	  I	  found	  them.	  One	  particularly	  insightful	  source	  of	  information	  was	  the	  animation	  materials	  created	  by	  PAGERNA	  to	  use	  during	  village	  training	  sessions.	  Throughout	  these	  reviews,	  I	  operated	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  texts	  and	  records	  tend	  to	  hide	  at	  least	  as	  much	  as	  they	  reveal.	  Throughout	  fieldwork,	  I	  kept	  a	  research	  journal	  to	  track	  emerging	  interpretations	  and	  hypotheses.	  I	  analyzed	  fieldnotes	  using	  an	  iterative	  strategy	  to	  identify	  qualitative	  themes	  and	  to	  warrant	  interpretations.	  I	  coded	  fieldnotes	  in	  a	  simple	  fashion	  using	  Microsoft	  Word.	  I	  use	  pseudonyms	  to	  refer	  to	  people	  and	  places	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  participants’	  anonymity.	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Decentralization in Senegal 
Since	  Independence	  in	  1960,	  Senegal	  has	  gone	  farther	  than	  almost	  any	  other	  West	  African	  nation	  in	  creating	  a	  legal	  framework	  for	  democratic	  decentralization	  (Ribot	  1999b).	  This	  framework	  came	  into	  being	  through	  several	  parallel	  processes.	  In	  the	  early	  days	  of	  Independence,	  president	  Léopold	  Sédar	  Senghor	  pursued	  an	  ambitious	  land	  tenure	  reform	  program,	  purporting	  to	  undo	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  colonial-­‐imposed	  system	  of	  inequitable	  landholdings	  and	  return	  to	  an	  authentic	  African	  socialist	  system	  (Galvan	  2004,	  p.	  128).	  The	  National	  Domain	  Law	  of	  1964	  declared	  all	  land	  the	  property	  of	  the	  state,	  but	  recognized	  farmer’s	  use-­‐rights	  to	  land	  they	  cleared	  and	  cultivated.	  Under	  the	  National	  Domain	  Law,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  rural	  land	  falls	  into	  one	  of	  two	  legal	  categories:	  land	  gazetted	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  central	  administration	  (‘private’	  and	  ‘public’	  state	  domain),	  and	  national	  domain	  land.	  Centrally	  administered	  land	  includes	  gazetted	  forest	  reserves	  (forêts	  classées)	  and	  national	  parks.	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  national	  domain	  land,	  and	  on	  the	  reforms	  and	  practices	  that	  shape	  management	  of	  forest	  resources	  in	  this	  category.	  The	  next	  stage	  of	  decentralization	  entailed	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  new	  administrative-­‐territorial	  unit:	  the	  rural	  community	  (communauté	  rurale).	  The	  rural	  community	  was	  nested	  within	  existing	  administrative	  divisions	  inherited	  from	  the	  colonial	  period.	  Each	  rural	  community	  was	  supposed	  to	  contain	  approximately	  30	  villages.	  Senegal’s	  national	  territory	  was	  thus	  divided	  (from	  largest	  to	  smallest	  unit)	  into:	  regions,	  departments,	  arrondissements,	  and	  rural	  communities.	  Rural	  communities	  were	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  rural	  councils,	  whose	  membership	  derived	  partially	  from	  local	  elections,	  and	  partially	  through	  appointment	  by	  agricultural	  cooperatives.10	  Continuing	  the	  French	  tutelle	  system,	  rural	  councils	  were	  supervised	  by	  sous-­‐préfets,	  centrally-­‐appointed	  civil	  servants	  at	  the	  arrondisement	  level,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Three-­‐quarters	  of	  councilors	  are	  elected	  from	  the	  lists	  of	  nationally-­‐recognized	  parties,	  while	  one	  quarter	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  boards	  of	  cooperatives.	  While	  elections	  were	  initially	  winner-­‐take-­‐all,	  in	  1990	  proportional	  elections	  were	  introduced	  (Post	  and	  Snel	  2003).	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  who	  were	  in	  turn	  supervised	  by	  préfets	  at	  the	  department	  level.	  While	  in	  theory	  sous-­‐
préfets	  only	  check	  that	  rural	  councils	  follow	  procedures,	  in	  practice	  they	  have	  substantial	  influence	  over	  council	  decision-­‐making	  (e.g.	  Ribot	  2009a).	  The	  hierarchy	  within	  government	  agencies	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  administrative-­‐territorial	  units.	  In	  the	  national	  forest	  service	  (Services	  des	  Eaux	  et	  Forêts	  et	  de	  Chasse),	  there	  are	  local	  agents	  (chef	  de	  
brigade)	  at	  the	  arrondissement	  level,	  sector	  heads	  (chef	  de	  secteur)	  at	  the	  department	  level,	  and	  inspectors	  (inspecteur	  regional)	  at	  the	  regional	  level.	  After	  their	  initial	  creation,	  rural	  councils	  were	  assigned	  very	  few	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  and	  provided	  very	  few	  resources.	  In	  1978,	  rural	  councils	  were	  charged	  with	  allocating	  land	  use	  in	  the	  national	  domain	  and	  resolving	  land	  use	  conflicts.	  However,	  councils	  were	  ineffective	  and	  their	  decisions	  were	  often	  superseded	  by	  the	  sous-­‐préfet	  (Blundo	  1997).	  Then	  in	  1996,	  under	  pressure	  from	  international	  donors,	  the	  national	  assembly	  passed	  a	  sweeping	  decentralization	  law	  that	  devolved	  9	  areas	  of	  competency	  to	  rural	  councils,	  including	  management	  of	  natural	  resources	  in	  national	  domain	  lands	  (RdS	  1996).	  Under	  this	  law,	  rural	  council	  presidents	  pass	  local	  laws	  based	  on	  deliberations	  by	  the	  full	  council.	  The	  council	  president	  appoints	  commissions	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  doing	  relevant	  studies,	  proposing	  laws,	  resolving	  conflicts,	  and	  dealing	  with	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  NGOs.	  Today,	  rural	  councils	  remain	  desperately	  under-­‐resourced.	  While	  certain	  council	  commissions	  receive	  small	  budget	  items	  from	  the	  central	  government,	  the	  environmental	  commission	  does	  not,	  often	  leaving	  it	  effectively	  powerless.	  Today,	  rural	  councils	  remain	  weak	  and	  under-­‐resourced.	  State	  administrators	  and	  development	  projects	  regularly	  bypass	  or	  subvert	  council	  decision-­‐making	  (Ribot	  2009a),	  and	  councils	  have	  little	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  rural	  residents	  (Galvan	  2004).	  Having	  briefly	  outlined	  the	  framework	  of	  decentralization	  in	  Senegal,	  we	  now	  focus	  in	  on	  the	  region	  in	  which	  the	  analytic	  story	  will	  unfold.	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Kaolack Study Area 
The	  area	  that	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  Kaolack	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  urban	  center	  of	  Kaolack,	  which	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  Kaolack	  City)	  lies	  on	  the	  border	  of	  several	  administrative,	  historical,	  and	  agro-­‐ecological	  zones	  (Figure	  1).	  It	  occupies	  the	  northwestern	  quadrant	  of	  today’s	  Kaolack	  Region,	  near	  the	  border	  with	  Fatick	  Region.11	  In	  addition	  to	  straddling	  today’s	  administrative	  boundaries,	  the	  area	  sits	  near	  the	  edge	  of	  two	  pre-­‐colonial	  states:	  Siin	  and	  Saalum.	  Kaolack	  also	  sits	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  two	  agro-­‐ecological	  zones,	  lying	  between	  the	  semi-­‐arid	  area	  known	  as	  the	  central	  peanut	  basin	  stretching	  north	  to	  Diourbel	  and	  Touba	  and	  the	  more	  humid	  southern	  area	  reaching	  south	  and	  southeast	  to	  the	  Gambian	  border.12	  Multiple	  ethnic	  groups	  live	  in	  Kaolack.	  It	  is	  conventionally	  associated	  with	  Serer13	  Saalum	  groups,	  but	  Serer	  Siin,	  Wolof,	  and	  Fulɓe	  groups	  also	  live	  in	  the	  area.	  Kaolack’s	  location	  along	  multiple	  borders	  poses	  a	  challenge	  for	  classifying	  it	  in	  a	  single	  historical	  setting.	  The	  brief	  depiction	  that	  follows	  draws	  on	  descriptions	  of	  neighboring	  zones	  and	  on	  observations	  collected	  during	  fieldwork.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In	  fact,	  the	  classification	  of	  this	  area	  has	  undergone	  a	  dizzying	  series	  of	  changes,	  as	  regional	  borders	  have	  been	  redrawn	  over	  the	  years.	  Although	  today	  located	  in	  Kaolack	  Region,	  two	  of	  my	  three	  research	  sites	  were	  until	  2008	  part	  of	  Fatick	  Region.	  
12	  Kaolack	  itself	  reported	  an	  average	  annual	  rainfall	  of	  608	  mm	  over	  the	  past	  30	  years.	  However,	  inter-­‐annual	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  Sahelian	  climate	  are	  dramatic.,	  and	  annual	  rainfall	  has	  varied	  between	  about	  400	  and	  800	  mm	  over	  the	  past	  50	  years.	  
13	  The	  seven	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  groups	  collectively	  referred	  to	  as	  Serer	  likely	  originated	  in	  the	  same	  area	  of	  northern	  Senegal.	  Differing	  incorporation	  into	  pre-­‐colonial	  states	  and	  subsequent	  collective	  memory	  help	  differentiate	  the	  groups	  (Galvan	  2004,	  p.	  39).	  	  
	   	  	   21	  Kaolack	  has	  long	  been	  a	  site	  of	  tension	  between	  centralized	  states,	  local	  authorities,	  and	  rural	  residents.14	  States	  emerged	  after	  the	  area	  was	  conquered	  in	  the	  early	  fifteenth	  century	  by	  an	  ethnically	  Manding	  group	  known	  as	  the	  Gelwaar.	  The	  Gelwaar	  formed	  alliances	  and	  inter-­‐married	  with	  Serer	  elites,	  producing	  a	  Serer-­‐speaking	  ruling	  class	  (Pélissier	  1966).	  This	  ruling	  class	  allowed	  village-­‐level	  land	  priests	  known	  as	  laman	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  land	  management	  in	  their	  territories	  (p.	  216).	  In	  the	  first	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  French	  colonial	  government	  extended	  its	  influence	  into	  Kaolack.	  The	  Gelwaar	  rulers	  by	  and	  large	  cooperated	  with	  the	  colonial	  government,	  maintaining	  their	  authority	  by	  becoming	  regional	  administrators	  (chefs	  de	  cercle)	  in	  the	  colonial	  hierarchy.	  After	  Independence,	  Kaolack	  residents	  did	  not	  forget	  the	  Gelwaar.	  They	  continued	  to	  resent	  Independent	  regional	  administrations	  as	  unaccountable	  representatives	  of	  an	  extractive	  central	  state	  (Galvan	  2004).	  Against	  this	  political	  history,	  I	  now	  sketch	  the	  basic	  traces	  of	  the	  landscape	  and	  land-­‐based	  economy	  of	  Kaolack.	  The	  French	  colonial	  state	  perceived	  Serer	  land	  management	  practices	  as	  the	  “ideal”	  peasant	  agrarian	  system	  in	  West	  Africa	  (Pélissier	  1966,	  p.	  183;	  Galvan	  2004).15	  Under	  this	  system,	  laman	  land	  priests	  monitored	  land	  use	  in	  their	  territories	  and	  enforced	  a	  multi-­‐year	  rotation	  in	  which	  land	  was	  systematically	  used	  to	  farm	  millet	  and	  sorghum,	  put	  to	  pasture,	  and	  fallowed.	  This	  system	  maintained	  soil	  fertility	  amidst	  the	  highest	  population	  densities	  in	  Senegal	  (Pélissier	  1966,	  p.	  184).	  In	  response	  to	  intense	  pressures	  from	  the	  colonial	  government	  to	  produce	  cash	  crops,	  the	  Serer	  quickly	  integrated	  peanuts	  into	  their	  crop	  rotation.	  Kaolack	  thus	  became	  the	  productive	  heart	  of	  the	  peanut	  basin	  during	  late	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Although	  Kaolack	  lies	  within	  the	  former	  boundaries	  of	  Saalum,	  in	  many	  ways,	  land-­‐use	  and	  ecological	  conditions	  more	  closely	  the	  densely	  settled	  Siin	  than	  the	  scattered	  populations	  and	  open	  pastures	  of	  eastern	  Saalum.	  One	  observer	  has	  considered	  the	  Saalum	  state	  marginal	  in	  comparison	  to	  Siin	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  conditions	  (Pélissier	  1966).	  Certainly,	  Saalum	  is	  less	  well	  studied.	  
15	  Indeed,	  state	  services,	  development	  projects,	  and	  urban-­‐based	  observers	  still	  idealize	  this	  “lost”	  land	  tenure	  system.	  See	  how	  projects	  deployed	  this	  narrative	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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  colonial	  rule.	  However,	  in	  today’s	  Kaolack,	  the	  fallowing	  that	  was	  part	  of	  the	  former	  system	  is	  very	  rarely	  practiced.	  Some	  observers	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  practice	  was	  eliminated	  Senghor’s	  land	  reforms	  destabilized	  land	  tenure	  (Galvan	  2004).	  Regardless	  of	  the	  cause,	  oral	  histories	  describe	  a	  dramatic	  expansion	  of	  cultivated	  area	  in	  Kaolack	  between	  1900	  and	  1960	  and	  the	  disappearance	  of	  fallow	  land.	  Today,	  Kaolack	  is	  densely	  settled	  and	  dominated	  by	  agriculture.	  Villages	  are	  often	  small,	  with	  less	  than	  400	  residents,	  and	  close	  together,	  separated	  by	  only	  1	  to	  5	  km.	  Although	  most	  of	  the	  area	  is	  occupied	  by	  fields,	  oral	  accounts	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  substantially	  more	  uncultivated	  land	  today	  compared	  to	  forty	  years	  ago.	  The	  change	  is	  attributed	  to	  vastly	  reduced	  government	  support	  for	  agriculture,	  falling	  soil	  fertility,	  and	  substantial	  temporary	  and	  permanent	  out-­‐migration.	  In	  addition	  to	  abandoned	  fields,	  another	  class	  of	  uncultivated	  land	  exists	  in	  today’s	  Kaolack:	  narrow	  bands	  50	  to	  200	  m	  wide	  crisscross	  the	  region	  and	  connect	  villages,	  small	  pastures,	  and	  watering	  points.	  Known	  in	  Wolof	  as	  saawo,	  these	  ‘corridors’	  allow	  village-­‐based	  livestock	  to	  move	  to	  pasture	  and	  water	  during	  the	  agricultural	  season,	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  animals	  damaging	  crops.	  The	  interconnected	  network	  of	  saawo	  also	  allows	  transhumant	  pastoralists	  to	  move	  large	  herds	  across	  the	  region,	  traveling	  between	  the	  extensive,	  arid	  pastures	  of	  Djolof	  in	  northern	  Senegal	  and	  humid	  regions	  south	  and	  east	  of	  Kaolack.	  While	  village	  chiefs	  and	  rural	  councils	  prohibited	  farming	  in	  the	  saawo,	  they	  did	  not	  regulate	  use	  of	  wood,	  fodder,	  or	  fruits;	  vegetation	  in	  the	  corridors	  constituted	  an	  essentially	  open-­‐access	  resource.	  Residents	  report	  that	  by	  the	  1990s,	  the	  saawo	  were	  devoid	  of	  trees	  and	  shrubs,	  covered	  by	  herbaceous	  plants	  during	  the	  rainy	  season	  and	  barren	  soil	  during	  the	  late	  dry	  season.	  Kaolack	  residents’	  livelihoods	  have	  changed	  substantially	  in	  the	  past	  fifty	  years.	  In	  the	  1960s,	  French	  anthropologist	  Paul	  Pélissier	  concluded	  that	  the	  Serer	  eschewed	  the	  rural-­‐to-­‐urban	  migration	  and	  non-­‐agricultural	  activities	  pursued	  by	  Wolof	  and	  Fulɓe	  groups	  of	  Senegal	  (1966,	  p.	  190).	  Such	  a	  model	  no	  longer	  holds	  roday.	  Households	  in	  Kaolack	  employ	  multiple	  and	  shifting	  livelihood	  types.	  While	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  households	  invest	  some	  of	  their	  assets	  in	  agriculture,	  most	  also	  pursue	  other	  strategies.	  Members	  of	  many	  households	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  pursue	  day	  labor,	  seasonal	  employment,	  and	  education	  in	  nearby	  urban	  centers.	  With	  increasing	  migration	  and	  steady	  economic	  and	  political	  decline	  in	  rural	  areas,	  it	  has	  become	  common	  wisdom	  that	  a	  household	  that	  relies	  solely	  on	  agriculture	  and	  livestock	  is	  a	  poor	  one.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  is	  the	  poorest	  households	  that	  rely	  on	  exploiting	  Kaolack’s	  meager	  forest	  resources.	  The	  dominance	  of	  agricultural	  land-­‐uses	  makes	  Kaolack	  Region	  marginal	  for	  forest	  resource	  production	  for	  the	  national	  market.	  While	  in	  much	  of	  eastern	  and	  southern	  Senegal	  forest	  cover	  is	  dense	  and	  forestry	  policy	  overwhelmingly	  favors	  urban-­‐based	  merchant	  elites	  (Ribot	  1995,	  2001,	  2009;	  Post	  2003),	  forest	  resources	  in	  Kaolack	  are	  sparse	  and	  of	  low	  value.	  The	  forest	  service	  closed	  commercial	  production	  of	  wood	  products	  (including	  charcoal,	  firewood	  and	  construction	  wood)	  in	  the	  region	  in	  the	  1980s,	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  tree	  resources	  in	  the	  area	  were	  exhausted	  (Bodian	  and	  Jorez	  2009).	  By	  this	  time,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  major	  commercial	  interests	  had	  long	  since	  departed	  for	  regions	  with	  denser	  volumes	  of	  standing	  wood	  (Ribot	  1999a).16	  	  Small	  producers,	  however,	  continued	  to	  work	  clandestinely,	  especially	  in	  forests	  near	  the	  towns	  of	  Keur	  Sosé	  and	  Gossas	  (Goossens	  et	  al.	  2007).	  Moreover,	  in	  addition	  to	  those	  who	  specialize	  in	  forestry,	  many	  households	  practiced	  occasional,	  small-­‐scale	  woodcutting.	  Proximity	  to	  urban	  markets	  in	  which	  wood	  products	  hold	  relatively	  high	  value	  allowed	  residents	  to	  market	  products	  by	  the	  cartload	  and	  to	  avoid	  detection	  by	  law	  enforcement.	  As	  will	  be	  detailed,	  the	  harvesting	  and	  marketing	  of	  forest	  products	  remains	  widespread	  in	  Kaolack,	  but	  is	  primarily	  pursued	  by	  the	  poorest	  households.	  Better-­‐off	  households	  avoid	  direct	  involvement	  in	  woodcutting;	  the	  potential	  earnings	  are	  too	  low	  and	  the	  risks	  of	  being	  caught	  and	  sanctioned	  too	  high.	  Yet	  many	  households	  with	  secure	  incomes	  in	  most	  years	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  likely	  the	  low	  value	  of	  the	  remaining	  forest	  resources	  that	  made	  a	  closure	  politically	  feasible.	  Charcoal	  patrons	  have	  been	  able	  to	  secure	  access	  to	  tree	  stocks	  that	  are	  commercially	  valuable	  regardless	  of	  state	  policy,	  through	  non-­‐legal	  means	  (Post	  and	  Snel	  2003).	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  rely	  on	  woodcutting	  after	  failed	  agricultural	  seasons	  and	  in	  other	  periods	  of	  crisis.17	  In	  sum,	  rural	  Kaolack	  is	  characterized	  by	  dense	  agriculture,	  sparse	  forest	  resources,	  and	  small-­‐scale	  forest	  use.	  This	  situation	  means	  that	  the	  stakes	  of	  forest	  management	  are	  low	  for	  national	  governments	  and	  powerful	  private	  enterprises,	  but	  they	  are	  high	  for	  poor	  residents.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  political	  economic	  context	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  outcomes	  of	  community	  based	  forest	  management.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  story	  of	  how	  forest	  governance	  was	  transformed	  in	  Kaolack.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Research	  on	  common	  pool	  resources	  has	  found	  that	  the	  rural	  poor	  are	  especially	  dependent	  on	  common-­‐property	  forests,	  and	  their	  dependent	  increases	  during	  times	  of	  crisis	  (Chambers	  and	  Leach	  1989,	  McSweeney	  2004).	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3. FOREST STALEMATE: STATE REGULATION AND PEASANT RESISTANCE 
Prior	  to	  the	  1990s,	  the	  contours	  of	  forest	  regulation	  in	  Kaolack	  Region	  had	  remained	  unchanged	  for	  nearly	  seventy	  years.	  State	  regulation	  criminalized	  the	  forest	  use	  activities	  of	  individual	  residents,	  and	  the	  forest	  service	  dominated	  monitoring,	  enforcement,	  and	  sanctioning.18	  Policies	  to	  encourage	  rural	  residents	  to	  incorporate	  themselves	  into	  this	  system	  had	  been	  largely	  unsuccessful.	  In	  fact,	  residents	  employed	  everyday	  strategies	  of	  resistance	  to	  avoid	  forest	  restrictions:	  they	  cut	  trees	  in	  national	  domain	  and	  gazetted	  forests,	  ignoring	  the	  official	  permitting	  system.	  Further,	  peasants	  acted	  in	  solidarity	  to	  leave	  infractions	  unreported	  and	  hide	  rule-­‐breakers	  from	  forest	  service	  agents.	  Faced	  with	  sanctions,	  they	  drew	  on	  social	  networks	  and	  client-­‐patron	  relations	  to	  avoid	  or	  reduce	  fines.	  None	  of	  these	  strategies	  challenged	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  forest	  service	  to	  enforce	  forest	  regulations.	  In	  combination,	  however,	  they	  allowed	  peasants	  to	  avoid	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  hardships	  these	  regulations	  threatened	  to	  impose	  on	  them.	  	  
Forest Law in Senegal: Legal Framework and Practice 
Since	  Independence,	  forest	  regulation	  in	  Senegal	  has	  been	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  national	  forest	  service.	  Policy	  has	  been	  dictated	  by	  the	  central	  government	  administration,	  and	  designed	  to	  uphold	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  merchants	  who	  control	  the	  production	  and	  transport	  of	  high-­‐value	  forest	  products	  such	  as	  firewood,	  charcoal,	  and	  resins	  (Freudenberger	  1992;	  Ribot	  1995,	  2001).	  Forestry	  regulation	  has	  been	  based	  on	  a	  division	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  This	  is	  not	  to	  claim	  that	  forest	  protection	  was	  the	  only	  state	  project.	  Indeed,	  many	  other	  state	  policies	  have	  worked	  at	  cross-­‐purposes	  to	  forest	  protection.	  Agricultural	  policies	  such	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  animal-­‐traction-­‐driven	  cash	  crop	  agriculture	  have	  likely	  contributed	  far	  more	  to	  the	  disappearance	  and	  degradation	  of	  forest	  cover	  than	  have	  local	  uses	  of	  tree	  resources.	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  between	  subsistence	  and	  commercial	  use	  since	  the	  French	  West	  Africa	  Forestry	  Law	  of	  1935.	  This	  colonial	  law	  required	  permits	  for	  the	  transportation	  and	  sale	  of	  forest	  products,	  which	  was	  restricted	  to	  companies	  owned	  by	  French-­‐literate	  citizens	  of	  the	  communes	  (French-­‐ruled	  urban	  centers).	  African	  residents	  of	  rural	  areas	  were	  restricted	  to	  limited	  and	  subsistence	  use	  of	  forest	  resources.	  This	  division	  between	  permit-­‐regulated	  commercial	  activities	  and	  non-­‐permitted	  but	  limited	  subsistence	  use	  has	  persisted	  to	  this	  day,	  with	  little	  modification	  (Ribot	  2001),	  although	  Senegal	  has	  since	  revised	  its	  forest	  code	  twice.	  In	  1994,	  a	  new	  Forest	  Code	  was	  written	  in	  response	  to	  the	  international	  trend	  towards	  participatory	  forest	  management	  (RdS	  1994).	  In	  1998,	  the	  code	  was	  again	  revised	  to	  reflect	  the	  devolution	  of	  powers	  to	  rural	  councils	  under	  the	  1996	  decentralization	  laws	  (RdS	  1996,	  1998).	  The	  1998	  code	  also	  recognized	  the	  authority	  of	  rural	  council	  presidents	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  forests	  in	  their	  districts.	  Control	  over	  the	  allocation	  of	  permits	  and	  licenses,	  however,	  remained	  centralized	  (Ribot	  2009a).	  The	  1998	  forest	  code	  remains	  in	  place	  to	  this	  day.19	  Provisions	  in	  the	  forest	  code	  effectively	  criminalized	  almost	  all	  small-­‐scale	  forest	  production	  in	  Kaolack,	  placing	  strain	  on	  local	  livelihoods.	  Under	  the	  1998	  forest	  code,	  a	  potential	  producer	  must	  request	  an	  exploitation	  permit	  from	  the	  president	  of	  the	  rural	  council.	  If	  granted,	  the	  requester	  must	  take	  the	  approval	  letter	  to	  the	  local	  forest	  service	  agent	  (whose	  office	  may	  be	  more	  than	  30	  km	  away	  in	  the	  arrondissement	  seat).	  The	  forest	  service	  agent	  then	  inspects	  the	  trees	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  are	  not	  protected	  species	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Since	  2008,	  the	  government	  has	  been	  working	  on	  revising	  the	  forest	  code	  once	  again,	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  pressure	  from	  donor-­‐funded	  projects	  like	  the	  one	  discussed	  below.	  The	  revision	  is	  in	  theory	  intended	  to	  address	  the	  roadblocks	  to	  implementing	  the	  decentralization	  provisions	  of	  the	  1998	  code.	  The	  new	  code	  will	  likely	  recognize	  decentralized	  forest	  management	  ‘tools’	  such	  as	  local	  conventions	  developed	  by	  projects.	  However,	  as	  of	  writing,	  the	  new	  code	  had	  not	  been	  voted	  on	  by	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  It	  remains	  deeply	  uncertain	  whether	  the	  language	  in	  the	  revised	  code	  will	  support	  decentralization	  (Ribot	  2009b).	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  that	  the	  harvest	  would	  not	  be	  ecologically	  harmful.	  The	  requester	  must	  pay	  for	  the	  inspection	  (generally	  paying	  for	  fuel	  plus	  a	  small	  under-­‐the-­‐table	  payment	  to	  the	  agent),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  tax	  on	  the	  quantity	  of	  wood	  or	  other	  products	  to	  be	  harvested.	  For	  relatively	  low-­‐value	  forest	  products,	  the	  tax	  rate	  and	  fees	  are	  such	  that	  small	  producers	  earn	  very	  little	  through	  legal	  sales.	  Furthermore,	  almost	  all	  economically	  valuable	  trees	  are	  classified	  as	  protected	  species,	  meaning	  that	  only	  dead	  trees	  can	  be	  harvested.	  For	  other	  types	  of	  tree	  resources	  too,	  the	  forest	  code	  imposes	  harsh	  limitations.	  For	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  transport	  wild	  fruit	  to	  market,	  it	  must	  be	  picked	  while	  hard	  and	  unripe.	  The	  forest	  code,	  however,	  mandates	  that	  only	  ripe	  fruit	  can	  be	  picked.	  Overall,	  the	  procedures	  and	  taxes	  specific	  in	  forestry	  regulation	  make	  legal	  production	  economically	  unviable.	  Forestry	  regulation	  effectively	  criminalizes	  all	  commercial	  forest	  use	  in	  Kaolack.	  By	  outlawing	  small-­‐scale	  commercial	  forest	  use,	  regulation	  creates	  a	  massive	  enforcement	  burden	  for	  the	  forest	  service.	  Since	  many	  households	  rely	  on	  forest	  use,	  infractions	  occur	  constantly	  and	  ubiquitously	  across	  the	  landscape.	  Yet	  the	  forest	  service	  has	  extremely	  limited	  capacity	  to	  witness	  and	  persecute	  infractions,	  with	  a	  single	  field	  agent	  assigned	  to	  an	  arrondissement	  (in	  western	  Kaolack,	  an	  area	  of	  about	  500	  square	  km).	  Monitoring	  this	  vast	  area	  of	  land,	  crossed	  by	  at	  best	  a	  couple	  improved	  roads,	  is	  far	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  single	  agent,	  who	  often	  lacks	  even	  fuel	  for	  his20	  motorcycle.	  Agents	  thus	  have	  little	  chance	  of	  witnessing	  infractions,	  let	  alone	  of	  locating	  and	  sanctioning	  rule-­‐breakers.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  constraints,	  Senegalese	  forestry	  policy	  includes	  a	  system	  that	  aims	  to	  incorporate	  rural	  residents	  into	  the	  enforcement	  of	  regulations.	  The	  primary	  tool	  the	  forest	  service	  attempts	  to	  use	  to	  achieve	  forest	  regulation	  on	  its	  constrained	  budget	  is	  the	  “contentieux	  system.21”	  In	  the	  context	  of	  forest	  regulation,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  forest	  service	  agents	  in	  rural	  posts	  have	  been	  men,	  although	  today	  the	  administration	  occasionally	  posts	  female	  agents	  to	  rural	  areas.	  
21	  The	  French	  term	  contentieux	  refers	  to	  matters	  of	  litigation	  or	  dispute	  in	  general.	  	  
	   	  	   28	  
contentieux	  refer	  to	  the	  legal	  framework	  that	  purports	  to	  incentivize	  forest	  service	  agents	  to	  persecute	  infractions	  and	  to	  incentivize	  rural	  residents	  to	  collaborate	  with	  foresters.	  It	  works	  through	  a	  simple	  commission:	  when	  a	  fine	  is	  issued,	  10%	  goes	  to	  the	  forest	  agent	  who	  formally	  reports	  the	  infraction	  (the	  “verbalizer”)	  and	  20%	  goes	  to	  the	  person	  who	  alerted	  the	  agent	  (the	  “indicator”).	  The	  remaining	  70%	  of	  the	  fine	  goes	  towards	  to	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  rural	  council.	  Through	  the	  contentieux	  policy,	  the	  Forest	  Service	  hopes	  financial	  renumeration	  will	  overcome	  the	  social	  bonds	  that	  commit	  peasants	  (and	  rural	  councilors)	  to	  their	  relatives	  and	  neighbors.	  The	  forest	  service	  hopes	  that	  peasants	  will	  become	  its	  eyes	  and	  ears	  in	  rural	  areas.	  However,	  forest	  administrators	  and	  agents	  are	  aware	  that	  the	  contentieux	  structure	  as	  practiced	  in	  rural	  districts	  in	  Senegal	  bears	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  one	  laid	  out	  by	  law.	  Indeed,	  the	  collection	  and	  distribution	  of	  fine	  money	  varies	  by	  region	  and	  according	  to	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  regional	  inspector.	  For	  instance,	  when	  a	  forest	  agent	  apprehends	  a	  rule-­‐breaker,	  he	  is	  supposed	  to	  document	  the	  infraction	  in	  a	  report	  known	  as	  a	  procès	  verbal,	  which	  in	  theory	  records	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “indicator”	  and	  “verbalizer.”	  However,	  in	  all	  the	  procès	  verbaux	  reports	  I	  inspected,	  the	  agent	  logged	  himself	  as	  both	  the	  indicator	  and	  verbalizer.	  Further,	  according	  to	  the	  law,	  the	  forest	  agent	  collects	  his	  portion	  of	  the	  fine	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  “indicator.”	  In	  many	  cases,	  however,	  fine	  money	  is	  never	  distributed	  to	  agents,	  but	  used	  to	  repair	  vehicles	  and	  equipment	  at	  the	  regional	  forestry	  office	  or	  else	  pocketed	  by	  the	  inspector	  himself	  (G.	  Blundo,	  personal	  communication).	  Regardless	  of	  how	  fines	  are	  redistributed,	  the	  20%	  specified	  in	  the	  forest	  code	  is	  never	  paid	  to	  the	  “indicator.”	  Yet	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  no	  rewards	  for	  reporting	  infractions.	  Forest	  service	  agents	  keep	  track	  of	  favored	  village	  informants	  and	  reward	  them	  with	  under-­‐the-­‐table	  payments.	  These	  payments,	  however,	  are	  given	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  agent.	  These	  practices	  and	  their	  variations	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  Kaolack;	  largely	  similar	  observations	  have	  been	  made	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  Senegal	  (G.	  Blundo,	  personal	  communication;	  J.C.	  Ribot,	  personal	  communication).	  In	  sum,	  the	  distribution	  of	  fines	  in	  practice	  bears	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  contentieux	  system	  as	  spelled	  out	  in	  law.	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  Regardless	  of	  the	  particular	  way	  forest	  fines	  are	  collected	  and	  redistributed,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  stable	  system	  of	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  that	  remains	  unspoken	  for	  the	  actors	  involved.	  Candidly,	  foresters	  and	  villagers	  alike	  admit	  that,	  on	  the	  ground,	  things	  don’t	  work	  as	  the	  books	  say	  they	  should.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  contradiction	  between	  law	  and	  practice	  is	  precisely	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  law,	  because	  it	  provides	  an	  additional	  degree	  of	  discretion	  to	  forest	  agents	  and	  administrators.	  For	  any	  particular	  infraction,	  foresters	  can	  choose	  whether	  to	  implement	  the	  letter-­‐of-­‐the-­‐law,	  employ	  the	  accepted	  informal	  practice,	  or	  negotiate	  another	  outcome	  (Lund	  2008,	  p.135).	  Yet	  one	  thing	  that	  forest	  law	  enforcement	  has	  not	  achieved	  in	  Senegal	  is	  the	  collaboration	  of	  the	  rural	  population.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  rural	  residents	  widely	  resist	  forest	  regulations.	  	  
Everyday Resistance to Forest Regulation 
In	  most	  parts	  of	  Senegal,	  infractions	  of	  the	  forest	  code	  are	  rampant.22	  Villagers	  continue	  to	  lop	  branches,	  cut	  protected	  tree	  species,	  pick	  unripe	  fruits,	  and	  take	  products	  to	  market	  without	  the	  required	  permits.	  They	  capitalize	  on	  the	  weak	  capacity	  of	  the	  forest	  service	  to	  monitor	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  most	  stringent	  regulations.	  Yet	  rule-­‐breaking	  is	  not	  an	  inevitable	  result	  of	  low	  state	  capacity.	  It	  takes	  work	  and	  calculation;	  villagers	  employ	  careful	  strategies	  to	  weaken	  the	  state’s	  grip	  on	  forests.	  These	  strategies	  exhibit	  many	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  Scott’s	  everyday	  forms	  of	  resistance	  (1985).	  Furthermore,	  they	  are	  supported	  by	  widespread	  solidarity	  among	  rural	  residents,	  crossing	  social	  and	  familial	  divisions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Indeed,	  resistance	  to	  state	  forest	  regulation	  and	  appropriation	  in	  Senegal	  has	  rarely	  been	  manifested	  in	  large-­‐scale,	  public	  rebellions	  or	  protests.	  Ribot	  (2000)	  describes	  an	  exception	  in	  which	  a	  number	  of	  villages	  individually	  resisted	  the	  presence	  of	  charcoalers,	  without	  forming	  an	  organized	  inter-­‐village	  movement.	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  Rural	  residents	  undertake	  a	  variety	  of	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  forestry	  regulation,	  including	  hiding	  illegal	  activities,	  faking	  compliance,	  and	  negotiating	  sanctions.	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  hiding,	  is	  undertaken	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  perceived	  seriousness	  of	  the	  forest	  code	  infraction.	  For	  example,	  a	  woman	  stocking	  firewood	  may	  walk	  along	  a	  cattle	  corridor	  with	  a	  machete	  in	  broad	  daylight	  and,	  once	  she	  has	  collected	  enough	  wood,	  ask	  her	  son	  to	  drive	  her	  cartload	  to	  town	  along	  the	  main	  road.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  man	  looking	  to	  cut	  down	  a	  dimb	  tree	  would	  be	  more	  cautious,	  likely	  working	  at	  night	  and	  carting	  the	  wood	  over	  field	  tracks	  to	  avoid	  being	  spotted	  by	  law	  enforcement.	  A	  second	  form	  of	  resistance	  involves	  disingenuous	  compliance	  with	  state	  procedures,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  woodcutter	  discretely	  girdles	  a	  tree,	  then	  seeks	  permission	  to	  cut	  it	  once	  it	  has	  died	  and	  dried	  out	  over	  a	  season.	  Thirdly,	  rural	  residents	  use	  various	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  or	  reduce	  the	  sanction	  they	  face	  if	  they	  are	  caught.	  Some	  woodcutters	  seek	  letters	  of	  permission	  from	  village	  chiefs,	  rural	  councilors,	  or	  religious	  leaders,	  which	  they	  use	  to	  demonstrate	  they	  have	  passed	  through	  an	  authority,	  even	  if	  not	  the	  one	  specified	  in	  law.	  If	  caught	  by	  a	  forest	  service	  agent,	  almost	  all	  rule-­‐breakers	  appeal	  for	  forgiveness	  or	  leniency.	  They	  appeal	  to	  shared	  norms	  about	  the	  right	  to	  subsistence	  (similar	  to	  those	  described	  by	  Scott	  1976),	  or	  to	  religious	  or	  national	  identities.	  They	  may	  also	  petition	  religious	  or	  political	  authorities	  through	  “arrangements”	  and	  “interventions”23	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  sanctions.24	  These	  strategies	  ensure	  that	  when	  catching	  a	  rulebreaking	  entails	  not	  the	  impartial	  application	  of	  a	  law,	  but	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation.	  The	  forestry	  agent	  demands	  a	  “fine”	  which	  is	  then	  bargained	  by	  both	  sides.	  Eventually,	  a	  compromise	  is	  reached	  that	  is	  more	  favorable	  to	  both	  parties	  than	  the	  official	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Residents	  throughout	  Senegal	  use	  these	  French	  terms.	  Arrangement	  refers	  a	  negotiation	  between	  the	  authority	  and	  the	  rule-­‐breaker,	  often	  involving	  a	  payment.	  Intervention	  refers	  to	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  third-­‐party,	  often	  a	  chief,	  religious	  leader,	  or	  political	  figure	  made	  to	  the	  authority	  (or	  her/his	  superior)	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  rule-­‐breaker.	  
24	  Of	  course,	  the	  rich	  are	  better	  able	  to	  afford	  a	  bribe	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  influential	  contacts	  who	  can	  intervene	  on	  their	  behalf.	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  system:	  the	  rule-­‐breaker	  pays	  less	  than	  the	  legal	  penalty	  and	  the	  forest	  agent	  receives	  more	  than	  he	  would	  through	  official	  channels.	  Of	  course,	  extra-­‐legal	  taxes	  on	  resource	  users	  are	  characteristic	  outcomes	  of	  harsh	  regulation	  of	  small-­‐scale	  resource	  use	  (e.g.	  Agrawal	  2005a,	  Neumann	  1998).	  Yet	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  encounters	  are	  not	  pre-­‐determined	  (Blundo	  and	  de	  Sardan	  2006b).	  The	  final	  settlement	  is	  a	  factor	  the	  rulebreaker’s	  and	  the	  agent’s	  skills	  at	  negotiating,	  and	  capacities	  to	  mobilize	  outside	  sources	  of	  authority.	  	  Across	  the	  diversity	  of	  practices	  employed	  by	  peasants	  to	  avoid	  forest	  regulation,	  one	  factor	  is	  crucial	  to	  their	  success:	  solidarity	  among	  rural	  residents.	  As	  one	  forester	  put	  it:	  It’s	  not	  just	  that	  [the	  risk	  of	  being	  fined].	  The	  population	  often	  says	  that	  the	  rule	  breakers	  are	  people	  just	  like	  them.	  It’s	  a	  mentality	  here.	  Do	  you	  know	  the	  expression:	  ‘Ba	  doola	  menaatul	  jàpp	  moromam’25?	  If	  two	  people	  come	  from	  the	  same	  village,	  it’s	  often	  a	  question	  of	  honor.	  In	  other	  words,	  residents	  resist	  regulation	  by	  refusing	  to	  report	  infractions	  they	  witness,	  and	  by	  covering	  up	  for	  one	  another.	  When	  a	  forester	  arrives	  in	  a	  village	  to	  ask	  about	  an	  infraction,	  residents	  -­‐	  from	  children	  to	  the	  village	  chief	  -­‐	  pledged	  ignorance.	  When	  an	  incident	  is	  of	  particular	  concern,	  such	  as	  the	  cutting	  of	  a	  tree	  in	  someone’s	  field,	  the	  plaintif	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  seek	  mediation	  through	  a	  village	  chief	  or	  imam	  than	  to	  report	  the	  infraction	  to	  a	  forester.26	  Residents’	  reluctance	  to	  report	  infractions	  is	  supported	  by	  dense	  networks	  of	  kinship	  ties	  within	  villages,	  as	  well	  as	  significant	  inter-­‐villages	  ties.	  Solidarity	  is	  also	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  history	  of	  distrust	  of	  centralized	  authorities.	  It	  is	  widely	  believed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  A	  Wolof	  expression	  meaning:	  ‘a	  commoner	  cannot	  catch	  his	  peer.’	  This	  expression	  implies	  that	  it’s	  only	  a	  government-­‐appointed	  administrator	  that	  can	  (or	  should)	  enforce	  the	  law.	  	  
26	  Although	  tradition	  local	  authorities	  are	  bound	  by	  complex	  ties	  to	  outside	  elites	  and	  administrators	  that	  can	  make	  them	  more	  accountable	  to	  these	  actors	  than	  to	  village	  residents	  (Ribot	  2002,	  2009a),	  in	  Kaolack	  it	  was	  extremely	  rare	  for	  a	  chief	  to	  report	  an	  infraction	  to	  a	  forester.	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  that	  if	  you	  involve	  a	  state	  authority	  in	  a	  local	  conflict,	  you	  have	  ruined	  your	  relationship	  with	  your	  neighbors	  (Galvan	  2004).	  Although	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  rural	  residents	  are	  willing	  to	  report	  forestry	  infractions	  to	  forestry	  agents,	  these	  informers’	  deep	  concern	  with	  maintaining	  their	  anonymity	  demonstrates	  the	  strength	  of	  rural	  solidarity.	  In	  summary,	  until	  the	  1990s,	  harsh	  centralized	  forest	  regulations	  in	  Kaolack	  were	  checked	  by	  everyday	  resistance	  strategies	  based	  on	  rural	  solidarity.	  To	  identify	  the	  powerful	  effect	  of	  solidarity	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  Kaolack	  was	  a	  harmonious	  place,	  and	  that	  rural	  groups	  did	  not	  compete	  or	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.	  Instead,	  it	  means	  that	  rural	  social	  divisions	  were	  trumped	  by	  distrust	  of	  the	  central	  state.	  When	  a	  law	  enforcement	  agent	  came	  to	  the	  village,	  residents	  banded	  together.	  While	  everyday	  resistance	  did	  not	  win	  villagers	  control	  over	  their	  forests,	  it	  did	  allow	  them	  to	  access	  needed	  resources	  and	  markets,	  and	  to	  cope	  during	  times	  of	  intense	  hardship.	  In	  response,	  the	  forest	  service	  could	  do	  little	  but	  mount	  annual	  reforestation	  campaigns.	  Yet	  neither	  government	  administrators	  nor	  villagers	  anticipated	  how	  this	  stalemate	  would	  break	  down	  in	  the	  1990s	  with	  the	  arrival	  in	  Kaolack	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  intervention	  into	  forest	  management.	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4. PROJECT INTERVENTION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
Community-­‐based	  forest	  management	  arrived	  in	  earnest	  in	  Kaolack	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  By	  involving	  residents	  in	  regulating	  forests,	  it	  broke	  the	  stalemate	  between	  the	  forest	  service	  and	  rural	  forest	  users.	  Although	  several	  donor-­‐funded	  reforestation	  projects	  had	  existed	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  region	  during	  the	  1980s,	  none	  had	  sought	  to	  involve	  village	  actors	  beyond	  carrying	  out	  labor	  duties.27	  This	  changed	  in	  1994,	  when	  the	  PAGERNA28	  project	  (the	  “G”	  is	  pronounced	  like	  in	  “mirage”)	  appeared	  on	  the	  scene,	  determined	  to	  pursue	  a	  new	  approach.	  One	  of	  three	  natural	  resource	  management	  projects	  implemented	  by	  German	  development	  group	  GTZ,29	  PAGERNA	  was	  active	  between	  1994	  and	  2003	  in	  Kaolack	  and	  Fatick	  Regions.	  Over	  its	  lifetime,	  the	  project	  ran	  a	  budget	  of	  5.7	  million	  euros	  (RdS	  2004)	  and	  pursued	  a	  dizzying	  array	  of	  interventions	  into	  natural	  resource	  management,	  agricultural	  production,	  and	  credit	  provision.	  Its	  strategy	  derived	  from	  the	  participatory	  management	  wave	  that	  was	  sweeping	  the	  development	  sector,	  prioritizing	  landuse	  zoning	  (Batterbury	  1998)	  and	  community	  committees	  (Agrawal	  and	  Gibson	  1999,	  Manor	  2004).	  What	  was	  particular	  about	  PAGERNA	  was	  the	  earnest	  persistence	  with	  which	  project	  managers	  sought	  to	  establish	  community	  partners	  and	  to	  work	  around	  the	  forest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  PRECOBA	  and	  PREVINOBA	  were	  two	  projects	  that	  funded	  community	  woodlot	  and	  reafforestation	  projects	  in	  the	  Peanut	  Bassin	  area	  during	  the	  1980s.	  
28	  PAGERNA	  stands	  for	  Project	  Autopromotion	  et	  Gestion	  des	  Ressources	  Naturelles	  dans	  le	  Sine-­‐
Saloum	  (‘Auto-­‐promotion	  and	  Natural	  Resource	  Management	  Project	  in	  Sine-­‐Saloum’).	  Sine-­‐Saloum	  is	  the	  former	  administrative	  region	  encompassing	  Fatick	  and	  Kaolack.	  It	  was	  constructed	  as	  a	  broad	  agro-­‐ecological	  target	  zone	  by	  the	  project	  initiators.	  
29	  GTZ,	  Deutsche	  Gesellschaft	  für	  Technische	  Zusammenarbeit,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  development	  corporations	  owned	  by	  the	  German	  federal	  government,	  essential	  an	  international	  aid	  agency.	  These	  corporations	  has	  now	  been	  subsumed	  within	  a	  single	  entity,	  BMZ.	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  service’s	  objections	  to	  local	  management.	  Ultimately,	  the	  project	  became	  best	  known	  for	  pioneering	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  village	  conservation	  zones	  and	  quasi-­‐legal	  frameworks	  known	  as	  local	  conventions.	  It	  is	  the	  enduring	  effects	  of	  these	  interventions	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  and	  the	  following	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis.	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  detail,	  PAGERNA	  initiated	  a	  regime	  of	  environmental	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  implemented	  by	  local	  residents.	  Project	  staff	  focused	  on	  convincing	  local	  actors	  to	  create	  a	  patchwork	  of	  community	  conservation	  zones	  patrolled	  by	  village	  guards,	  and	  on	  generating	  local	  rules	  enforced	  by	  village	  chiefs	  and	  rural	  councilors.	  Yet	  staff	  did	  not	  envision	  fundamental	  changes	  that	  the	  project	  engendered:	  certain	  villagers,	  through	  their	  involvement	  in	  monitoring,	  enforcing,	  and	  coordinating	  management	  activities,	  began	  to	  think	  in	  a	  new	  way,	  linking	  forest	  resources	  with	  local	  self-­‐interest.	  They	  eventually	  adopted	  a	  more	  generalized	  discourse	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  As	  an	  unexpected	  byproduct	  of	  PAGERNA’s	  interventions,	  environmentalism	  became	  part	  of	  the	  norms	  and	  practices	  accepted	  by	  certain	  rural	  residents.	  	  
Community-based Forest Management and the PAGERNA Project 
Over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  interventions,	  PAGERNA	  introduced	  community-­‐based	  institutions	  into	  the	  regulation	  of	  forests	  in	  Kaolack.	  It	  did	  so	  through	  several	  new	  approaches.	  Early	  on,	  PAGERNA	  conducted	  training	  and	  education	  sessions	  in	  order	  to	  persuade	  villagers	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  One	  of	  the	  symbols	  used	  in	  these	  sessions	  was	  a	  large	  fabric	  scroll	  painted	  with	  various	  rural	  scenes,	  which	  villagers	  named	  malaan	  natal	  (cloth	  of	  images).	  Supported	  on	  a	  large	  easel,	  the	  scroll	  illustrated	  a	  narrative	  of	  environmental	  decline	  and	  redemption.	  It	  depicted	  elements	  of	  a	  Serer	  land	  management	  system	  dating	  from	  an	  unspecified	  past,	  which	  it	  portrayed	  as	  environmentally	  sustainable	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  and	  beneficial	  to	  rural	  residents.30	  A	  subsequent	  set	  of	  images	  identified	  practices	  seen	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment:	  cutting	  trees,	  charcoal	  production,	  plowing	  along	  stream	  beds,	  etc.	  The	  scroll	  then	  depicted	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  degradation:	  falling	  agricultural	  yields,	  soil	  erosion,	  and	  destructive	  winds.	  Finally,	  it	  displayed	  a	  set	  of	  technical	  actions	  that	  resolve	  these	  problems:	  assisted	  regeneration	  of	  trees,	  use	  of	  clay	  stoves,	  and	  zoning	  land	  for	  cattle	  paths,	  wind	  breaks,	  and	  pasture.	  Of	  course,	  these	  were	  precisely	  the	  actions	  PAGERNA	  proposed	  that	  villagers	  undertake.	  Today,	  malaan	  natal	  is	  the	  first	  thing	  villagers	  recall	  about	  PAGERNA.	  By	  contrasting	  the	  vaguely-­‐specified	  ‘good	  old	  days’	  with	  today’s	  experience	  of	  agricultural	  decline,	  the	  scroll	  tapped	  into	  dominant	  historical	  memories.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  these	  images	  became	  touchstones	  for	  certain	  residents,	  who	  began	  to	  shape	  for	  themselves	  identities	  based	  on	  environmental	  values.	  PAGERNA’s	  initial	  efforts	  to	  convince	  residents	  of	  the	  need	  for	  environmental	  protection	  and	  restoration	  were	  followed	  by	  opportunities	  for	  direct	  involvement	  in	  practices	  of	  environmental	  regulation.	  In	  early	  1995,	  the	  project	  piloted	  an	  approach	  to	  reforestation	  that	  it	  considered	  highly	  innovative.	  It	  labeled	  this	  approach	  zones	  mises	  en	  defens	  (protected	  zones).	  Staff	  drew	  the	  concept	  from	  villagers’	  reports	  about	  an	  existing	  practice	  of	  protecting	  small	  areas	  of	  forest.31	  What	  was	  novel	  about	  the	  idea	  was	  that	  protection	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Characterizing	  Serer	  land	  management	  as	  sustainable	  has	  precedent	  in	  the	  colonial	  state’s	  depictions	  of	  the	  Serer	  as	  “ideal	  peasants.”	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  land	  tenure	  in	  ‘Background,’	  above,	  and	  in	  Galvan	  (2004).	  
31	  According	  to	  project	  staff,	  the	  concept	  for	  the	  MED	  zone	  was	  developed	  independently	  by	  residents	  of	  two	  intervention	  villages.	  Villagers	  told	  project	  staff	  about	  small	  areas	  of	  land	  known	  in	  Wolof	  as	  mboolu	  yaatu.	  It	  was	  prohibited	  to	  clear	  these	  areas,	  which	  were	  densely	  covered	  with	  grass,	  shrubs,	  and	  trees.	  Although	  today	  they	  have	  disappeared	  in	  many	  villages,	  mboolu	  yaatu	  served	  as	  toilet	  areas	  in	  a	  region	  where	  built	  latrines	  were	  very	  rare.	  Partly	  inspired	  by	  the	  mboolu	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  would	  be	  established	  through	  community	  monitoring,	  and	  without	  constructing	  fencing	  or	  undertaking	  artificial	  reforestation.32	  Painted	  panels	  were	  placed	  around	  protected	  sites,	  declaring:	  “We	  are	  protecting	  this	  forest”	  (Àll	  bu	  nuy	  àar),	  with	  images	  indicating	  that	  cutting,	  setting	  fires,	  and	  farming	  were	  forbidden.	  After	  pilot	  protected	  zones	  were	  successful	  in	  several	  villages,	  PAGERNA	  disseminated	  this	  approach	  across	  all	  its	  village	  sites.	  Villages	  agreed	  to	  implement	  a	  total	  ban	  on	  cutting	  woody	  material	  in	  the	  protected	  zones.	  As	  one	  villager	  reported:	  “Not	  one	  toothpick	  could	  be	  taken.”	  However,	  collection	  of	  ripe	  fruit	  and	  pasturing	  animals	  were	  allowed.	  Village	  guards	  were	  appointed	  to	  enforce	  local	  regulations,	  stop	  rule-­‐breakers	  and,	  in	  coordination	  with	  village	  chiefs,	  levy	  local	  fines.	  Guards	  reported	  that	  during	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  protection	  they	  caught	  and	  fined	  many	  villagers,	  especially	  women	  who	  ventured	  into	  protected	  zones	  in	  search	  of	  firewood.	  (These	  were	  often	  the	  areas	  where	  women	  had	  collected	  firewood	  in	  the	  past.)	  Efforts	  were	  made	  to	  publically	  demonstrate	  that	  no	  one	  was	  above	  the	  new	  laws.	  Residents	  of	  PAGERNA’s	  first	  pilot	  site	  recalled	  how,	  when	  the	  wife	  of	  the	  village	  chief	  was	  caught	  cutting	  firewood	  in	  the	  protected	  zone,	  the	  chief	  stated	  that	  no	  one	  was	  above	  the	  law	  and	  paid	  the	  fine	  of	  3,000	  cfa	  (about	  6	  U.S.	  dollars)	  for	  his	  wife.	  Furthermore,	  not	  only	  local	  residents	  were	  caught.	  Village	  guards	  also	  arrested	  woodcutters	  and	  herders	  from	  neighboring	  villages	  and	  regions.	  When	  these	  outside	  rule-­‐breakers	  contested	  the	  local	  fine,	  village	  authorities	  warned	  them	  they	  could	  be	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  forest	  service	  agent,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
yaatu	  concept,	  several	  PAGERNA	  villages	  agreed	  to	  protect	  areas	  of	  unfarmed	  land,	  prohibiting	  any	  form	  of	  cutting.	  	  
32	  Villagers	  chose	  precise	  locations	  for	  zones	  mises	  en	  defens.	  Almost	  every	  one	  was	  designated	  on	  land	  not	  currently	  or	  previously	  used	  for	  agriculture.	  The	  potential	  areas	  for	  protection	  thus	  represented	  a	  minor	  portion	  of	  the	  landscape.	  Many	  of	  these	  areas	  were	  saawo	  livestock	  corridors.	  Under	  local	  land	  tenure,	  it	  was	  unthinkable	  to	  implant	  a	  protected	  zone	  on	  land	  categorized	  as	  fields,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  presently	  unfarmed.	  To	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  appropriate	  a	  field	  belonging	  to	  a	  lineage	  group.	  As	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  thesis,	  there	  was	  no	  precedent	  in	  local	  tenure	  systems	  for	  land	  owned	  collectively	  by	  a	  village,	  as	  were	  the	  zones	  mises	  en	  defens.	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  who	  would	  impose	  a	  much	  harsher	  sanction.	  Throughout	  this	  early	  period,	  project	  staff	  and	  rural	  council	  environmental	  commission	  presidents	  monitored	  the	  process.	  Six	  years	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  first	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones,	  the	  scope	  for	  participation	  in	  practices	  of	  regulation	  increased	  further.	  Villagers	  and	  rural	  councilors	  began	  to	  make	  requests	  to	  exploit	  the	  ample	  wood	  that	  had	  regenerated	  in	  the	  protected	  zones.	  PAGERNA,	  working	  within	  the	  framework	  set	  by	  the	  1998	  forest	  code,	  developed	  management	  plans	  (plans	  simple	  de	  gestion)	  for	  each	  village.	  These	  plans	  were	  carbon	  copies	  of	  one	  another,	  and	  simply	  restated	  many	  of	  the	  forest	  code	  rules	  governing	  national	  domain	  forests.	  They	  specified	  that	  forests	  be	  cut	  in	  blocks	  over	  a	  five-­‐year	  rotation.	  To	  initiate	  a	  cut,	  a	  village	  chief	  had	  to	  address	  a	  written	  request	  to	  the	  president	  of	  the	  rural	  council,	  who	  would	  then	  decide	  whether	  to	  authorize	  the	  cut.	  The	  local	  forest	  service	  agent	  would	  inspect	  the	  site	  to	  make	  sure	  cutting	  was	  “technically	  feasible”	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  proper	  cutting	  techniques	  to	  villagers.	  The	  management	  plans	  also	  specified	  how	  firewood	  was	  to	  be	  distributed:	  villagers	  who	  participated	  would	  receive	  half	  the	  volume	  of	  wood	  they	  cut	  free	  of	  charge;	  they	  could	  buy	  the	  remainder	  at	  prices	  set	  by	  the	  village	  committee.	  The	  plans	  dictated	  that	  sale	  revenues	  be	  divided,	  with	  25%	  going	  to	  village	  guards,	  10%	  as	  tax	  to	  the	  rural	  council,	  5%	  supporting	  inter-­‐village	  management	  committees,	  40%	  for	  a	  forest	  management	  fund,	  and	  10%	  supporting	  village	  infrastructure	  projects.	  However,	  in	  practice,	  village	  committees	  added	  the	  management	  fund	  into	  the	  village	  project	  fund,	  using	  the	  money	  to	  improve	  public	  facilities	  such	  as	  mosques,	  schools,	  and	  wells.	  They	  also	  used	  these	  funds	  to	  make	  short-­‐term	  loans	  to	  residents	  who	  needed	  medical	  treatment.	  Parallel	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  village-­‐level	  protected	  zones,	  PAGERNA	  created	  local	  regulatory	  conventions	  governing	  resource	  use,	  which	  it	  labeled	  ‘local	  conventions.’	  The	  conventions	  were	  developed	  following	  the	  1996	  passage	  of	  the	  national	  decentralization	  laws.	  Project	  managers	  saw	  the	  law	  as	  dictating	  that	  rural	  councils	  -­‐	  not	  village	  committees	  –	  must	  be	  in	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  charge	  of	  forest	  management.33	  The	  conventions	  were	  sets	  of	  rules	  on	  resource	  use	  elaborated	  through	  participatory	  workshops	  that	  included	  representatives	  of	  project-­‐identified	  social	  groups	  (farmers,	  herders,	  youth,	  and	  women).	  The	  conventions	  specified	  penalties	  for	  infractions34	  and	  divided	  management	  powers	  among	  different	  local	  institutions,	  linking	  village	  guards,	  village	  committees,	  multi-­‐village	  bodies	  known	  as	  CAC	  (cadres	  de	  concertation),	  and	  the	  rural	  council.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  rural	  councils’	  new	  powers	  over	  natural	  resource	  management,	  PAGERNA	  convinced	  councilors	  to	  deliberate	  and	  officialize	  the	  conventions	  as	  local	  law.	  While	  this	  officialization	  triggered	  push-­‐back	  from	  the	  forest	  service,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  it	  also	  produced	  effects	  on	  landscapes	  and	  on	  residents	  themselves.	  The	  community-­‐based	  forest	  management	  system	  helped	  to	  produce	  a	  biophysical	  and	  a	  political	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  Kaolack	  landscape.	  Project	  staff	  and	  villagers	  alike	  frequently	  cited	  robust	  natural	  regeneration	  within	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones	  as	  evidence	  of	  project	  success.	  In	  5	  years,	  the	  saawo	  –	  in	  which	  most	  woody	  material	  had	  once	  been	  cut	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  –	  sprouted	  trees	  reaching	  5	  to	  10	  meters.	  These	  were	  primarily	  the	  ubiquitous	  and	  fast	  growing	  species	  nger	  (Guiera	  senegalensis)	  and	  ratt	  (Combretum	  species).	  Villagers	  reported	  that,	  over	  a	  few	  years,	  views	  across	  open	  fields	  became	  blocked	  by	  areas	  of	  dense	  tree	  cover.	  In	  addition	  to	  biophysical	  changes,	  forest	  protection	  reworked	  land	  tenure	  patterns	  by	  transforming	  areas	  into	  village	  commons.35	  While	  previously,	  tree	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  In	  this	  respect,	  PAGERNA’s	  approach	  was	  very	  progressive.	  Other	  forest	  management	  development	  projects	  in	  Senegal	  were	  still	  using	  management	  committees	  –	  and	  ignoring	  rural	  councils	  –	  nearly	  a	  decade	  later	  (Faye	  2006).	  
34	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  changes	  to	  elaboration	  of	  fines	  and	  to	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  local	  conventions.	  
35	  Although	  hereditary	  laman	  authorities	  had	  once	  overseen	  the	  distribution	  of	  households’	  land	  between	  fields	  and	  pasture,	  there	  was	  no	  precedent	  for	  village-­‐held	  commons.	  As	  discussed	  in	  note	  
	   	  	   39	  resources	  in	  uncultivated	  areas	  were	  considered	  open-­‐access	  resources;	  following	  the	  creation	  of	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones,	  trees	  were	  restricted	  to	  residents	  of	  the	  village	  in	  charge	  of	  management.36	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  villagers	  asserted	  that	  they	  ‘owned’	  uncultivated	  land	  and	  persecuted	  residents	  of	  other	  villages	  who	  used	  the	  trees	  occurring	  there.	  In	  short,	  PAGERNA	  initiated	  a	  system	  of	  local	  regulation	  through	  which	  village	  actors,	  coordinated	  by	  the	  rural	  council,	  were	  responsible	  for	  monitoring,	  enforcement,	  and	  exploitation	  of	  protected	  zones.	  This	  system	  did	  not	  replace	  the	  national	  forestry	  laws	  describe	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  Rather,	  community	  management	  added	  to	  the	  already	  multi-­‐layered	  system	  of	  forest	  regulation	  in	  Senegal.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  community-­‐based	  regulation	  was	  not	  inevitable.	  The	  fact	  that	  PAGERNA	  became	  nationally	  well-­‐known	  for	  its	  approach	  demonstrates	  how	  difficult	  it	  has	  been	  for	  other	  development	  projects	  to	  generate	  lasting	  community	  involvement.	  Crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  PAGERNA	  model	  were	  a	  group	  of	  local	  residents	  who	  represented,	  advocated	  for,	  and	  enforced	  environmental	  protection.	  I	  describe	  these	  people	  as	  environmental	  activists.	  But	  where	  did	  these	  residents	  come	  from,	  and	  how	  did	  they	  come	  think	  this	  way?	  	  
From Peasants to Environmental Subjects 
Over	  the	  course	  of	  PAGERNA,	  residents	  in	  many	  villages	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  environmental	  activists.	  Village	  guards,	  chiefs,	  local	  politicians,	  farmers,	  and	  herders	  participated	  in	  regulation	  activities,	  and	  some	  began	  to	  value	  environmental	  protection.	  These	  activists	  came	  to	  think	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  an	  important	  contributor	  to	  the	  collective	  good	  and	  to	  see	  its	  management	  as	  a	  generalized	  responsibility.	  This	  change	  is	  surprising	  because	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  24,	  the	  existing	  category	  of	  mboolu	  yaatu	  was	  non-­‐productive,	  occupied	  tiny	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  landscape,	  and	  could	  hardly	  be	  said	  to	  be	  collectively	  owned.	  
36	  Further,	  only	  able-­‐bodied	  residents	  who	  could	  participate	  in	  organized	  cuts	  were	  able	  to	  freely	  access	  firewood	  resources.	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  might	  be	  labeled	  ‘environmentalist	  orientations’37	  were	  distinctly	  absent	  from	  the	  social	  landscape	  prior	  to	  community-­‐based	  management.	  I	  argue	  that	  their	  emergence	  reflects	  a	  process	  of	  subject	  formation.	  It	  is	  the	  actions	  and	  commitment	  of	  environmental	  activists	  that	  made	  community-­‐based	  environmental	  regulation	  possible.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  describe	  how	  certain	  people	  came	  to	  think	  and	  act	  in	  this	  way.	  Almost	  no	  one	  in	  rural	  Kaolack	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  environment	  prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  PAGERNA.	  In	  interviews,	  residents	  who	  are	  today	  active	  in	  protection	  consistently	  explained	  that,	  prior	  to	  the	  project,	  they	  had	  rarely	  thought	  about	  environmental	  issues.	  One	  village	  chief	  exclaimed:	  “Before	  the	  project,	  I	  was	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  woodcutters	  in	  the	  area!”38	  It	  was	  PAGERNA,	  the	  chief	  insisted,	  that	  made	  him	  realize	  that	  his	  activities	  had	  environmental	  impacts.	  Another	  villager	  and	  forest	  guard,	  Babacar	  Dieng,	  was	  bemused	  when	  I	  pressed	  that	  he	  must	  have	  known	  something	  about	  the	  environment	  prior	  to	  getting	  involved	  with	  PAGERNA.	  Babacar	  responded:	  “I	  was	  just	  a	  farmer.	  I	  would	  cut	  wood	  for	  firewood	  or	  when	  I	  built	  a	  roof.”	  Thus,	  not	  only	  did	  residents	  not	  participate	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  To	  say	  that	  many	  rural	  residents	  came	  to	  hold	  environmentalist	  orientations	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  conceptualized	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  residents	  of	  urban	  areas	  in	  developed	  countries,	  where	  most	  researchers	  have	  studied	  environmentalism.	  Nor	  does	  it	  attribute	  to	  these	  residents	  a	  necessary	  and	  inherent	  attachment	  to	  nature.	  Rather,	  to	  speak	  of	  environmentalist	  orientations	  means	  to	  identify	  the	  locally-­‐specific	  and	  socially	  differentiated	  ways	  that	  they	  think	  about	  the	  environment,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ways	  it	  ‘calls’	  to	  them	  to	  take	  particular	  kinds	  of	  action	  (Robbins	  2007).	  	  
38	  This	  statement	  is	  likely	  exaggerated	  in	  order	  to	  impress	  the	  researchers.	  By	  downplaying	  the	  environmental	  orientations	  they	  held	  in	  the	  past,	  residents	  seek	  to	  inflate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  project.	  Yet	  exaggeration	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  change	  was	  not	  real.	  Residents	  who	  use	  this	  technique	  are	  trying	  to	  establish	  themselves	  as	  ‘reformed’	  environmental	  destroyers,	  revealing	  that	  they	  feel	  they	  
are	  expected	  to	  be	  reformed.	  Otherwise,	  the	  village	  chief	  might	  have	  simply	  denied	  ever	  having	  committed	  an	  environmental	  infraction.	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  environmental	  regulation,	  they	  were	  little	  concerned	  with	  environmentalist	  discourses,	  even	  though	  these	  were	  widely	  circulated	  by	  the	  forest	  service,	  development	  projects,	  and	  the	  Senegalese	  media.	  Residents	  cut	  trees	  and	  knew	  that	  cutting	  was	  illegal,	  but	  they	  regarded	  forest	  code	  proscriptions	  as	  the	  arbitrary	  will	  of	  centralized	  power	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  coherent	  ideology.	  The	  notion	  that	  cutting	  represented	  a	  source	  of	  degradation	  was	  absent	  from	  village	  discourse.	  Why,	  then,	  did	  certain	  residents	  to	  participate	  in	  environmental	  regulation	  if	  they	  had	  not	  thought	  about	  the	  environment	  before?	  Some	  chose	  to	  participate	  opportunistically,	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  authority	  that	  involvement	  with	  a	  development	  project	  might	  bring.	  This	  limited	  commitment,	  however,	  soon	  expanded.	  This	  shift	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Babacar	  Dieng,	  the	  village	  forest	  guard	  mentioned	  above.	  An	  NGO	  staffer	  described	  how	  villagers	  perceived	  Dieng	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  project:	  	  People	  call	  him	  ‘the	  madman	  of	  the	  forest.’	  He	  wasn’t	  involved	  in	  any	  of	  the	  authorities	   that	  people	   thought	  were	   important.	  The	  other	  elders	  were	  all	   interested	  in	  more	   important	  posts:	  village	  chief,	  head	  of	   the	  environment,39	  head	   of	   health,	   head	   of	   market	   gardening,	   etc.	   They	  said:	   “Let	   [Babacar]	   take	   the	   forest	   guard	   post.	   That	   post	   is	   just	  problems.	   You	   have	   to	   chase	   offenders	   in	   the	   forest.	   They	   will	   even	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Although	  the	  NGO	  staffer	  mentioned	  the	  president	  of	  the	  environmental	  commission	  on	  the	  rural	  council	  as	  a	  position	  of	  authority,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  this	  position	  was	  actually	  not	  sought-­‐after	  prior	  to	  PAGERNA’s	  intervention.	  Since	  the	  environmental	  commission	  receives	  no	  budget	  allocation,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  one	  of	  the	  least	  sought-­‐after	  positions	  in	  most	  councils.	  The	  commission	  president	  did,	  however,	  acquire	  much	  more	  authority	  as	  a	  result	  of	  PAGERNA	  and	  subsequent	  projects.	  He	  became	  an	  authority	  whom	  projects	  were	  obliged	  to	  consult	  in	  their	  activities.	  In	  some	  cases,	  project	  involvement	  creates	  new	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  political	  status	  and	  patronage	  (e.g.	  Blundo	  1995).	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  NGO	  staffer	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  post-­‐project	  importance	  of	  the	  environmental	  commission.	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  throw	  spirits	  at	  you.	  You	  might	  get	  chopped	  by	  a	  machete.”	  They	  didn’t	  see	   at	   the	   time	   that	   the	   [forestry]	   activities	  would	   come	   so	   far.	   They	  didn’t	   see	   the	   project	   [producing	   things,]	   like	   it	   produces	   charcoal	  today.	  [Babacar]	  wanted	  to	  become	  an	  authority	  in	  something.	  This	  quote	  reveals	  two	  things	  about	  local	  conceptions	  of	  environmental	  management	  prior	  to	  PAGERNA.	  First,	  environmental	  management	  was	  so	  foreign	  to	  people	  that	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  man	  who	  pursued	  it	  was	  considered	  to	  have	  been	  crazy,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  involvement	  with	  a	  development	  project	  might	  represent	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  revenue.	  To	  undertake	  the	  role	  of	  a	  local	  law	  enforcer	  was	  seen	  as	  even	  crazier.	  It	  involved	  confronting	  not	  just	  neighbors	  and	  relatives,	  but	  potentially	  violent	  rule-­‐breakers40	  with	  whom	  a	  normal	  villager	  would	  have	  had	  no	  business.	  Second,	  the	  quote	  demonstrates	  that	  villagers	  did	  not	  anticipate	  substantial	  material	  benefits	  arising	  from	  forest	  management.	  However,	  Babacar	  saw	  the	  environment	  as	  a	  new	  domain	  of	  authority	  in	  which	  he	  could	  potentially	  establish	  a	  claim.	  Thus,	  Babacar	  initially	  participated	  in	  regulation	  in	  pursuit	  of	  limited	  self-­‐interest.	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  his	  interest	  in	  protection	  changed	  over	  time,	  and	  he	  came	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  good	  in-­‐and-­‐of	  itself.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  authority,	  other	  motives	  were	  also	  involved	  in	  appointing	  guards.	  In	  one	  village,	  local	  authorities	  nominated	  a	  farmer	  to	  be	  a	  village	  guard	  precisely	  because	  he	  was	  a	  well-­‐known	  woodcutter.	  By	  assigning	  responsibility	  for	  monitoring	  protected	  zones	  to	  an	  environmental	  rule-­‐breaker,	  authorities	  hoped	  to	  reform	  his	  behavior.	  They	  also	  hoped	  rule-­‐breakers	  would	  serve	  as	  effective	  guards	  because	  they	  “spend	  all	  of	  their	  time	  in	  the	  bush,”41	  and	  were	  more	  likely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  village	  in	  question	  borders	  an	  area	  that	  served	  as	  a	  center	  of	  clandestine	  charcoal	  production	  since	  the	  forest	  service	  banned	  exploitation	  in	  Kaolack	  region.	  The	  professional	  charcoalers	  whom	  a	  guard	  would	  have	  had	  to	  confront	  have	  long	  been	  persecuted	  by	  foresters,	  and	  might	  be	  threatened	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  village	  guard.	  
41	  In	  Kaolack,	  to	  say	  that	  a	  man	  “spends	  all	  his	  time	  in	  the	  bush”	  is	  to	  mock	  him	  and	  suggest	  that	  his	  behavior	  is	  bizarre.	  (See	  also	  the	  earlier	  quote	  about	  “the	  madman	  of	  the	  forest.”)	  The	  meaning	  of	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  to	  know	  of	  and	  witness	  infractions.	  Furthermore,	  woodcutters	  needed	  the	  position	  more	  than	  other	  better-­‐off	  villagers;	  it	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  redeem	  oneself	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  rural	  councilors	  and	  project	  staff.	  Although	  villagers	  were	  initially	  drawn	  to	  participate	  for	  diverse	  reasons,	  their	  commitment	  to	  practices	  and	  values	  of	  environmental	  protection	  expanded	  over	  time.	  Concern	  first	  emerged	  towards	  specific	  forest	  sites	  which	  villagers	  were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  managing.	  Later,	  however,	  these	  particular	  commitments	  changed	  into	  more	  general	  environmentalist	  orientations.	  After	  the	  establishment	  of	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones,	  village	  guards	  found	  themselves	  responsible	  for	  the	  management	  of	  a	  small	  patch	  of	  land,	  where	  they	  spent	  substantial	  amounts	  of	  time,	  sometimes	  bringing	  pots	  of	  green	  tea	  to	  spend	  an	  afternoon	  watching	  for	  rule-­‐breakers.	  Guards	  closely	  observed	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  trees	  regenerating	  in	  their	  protected	  zones,	  and	  reported	  on	  them	  to	  rural	  councilors	  and	  project	  staff.	  In	  some	  sense,	  then,	  protected	  zones	  because	  objects	  of	  affection	  towards	  which	  participants	  directed	  substantial	  attention,	  effort,	  and	  thought.	  Over	  time,	  the	  pool	  of	  participants	  who	  interacted	  with	  these	  zones	  expanded.	  After	  a	  year	  or	  two	  of	  enforcement,	  almost	  all	  residents	  were	  aware	  of	  rules,	  and	  many	  began	  to	  observe	  for	  themselves	  the	  effects	  protection	  was	  having	  on	  the	  landscape.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  annual	  firewood	  exploitation,	  villagers	  began	  to	  cut	  wood	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  village	  guards	  and	  forest	  service	  agents,	  who	  instructed	  them	  on	  which	  species	  they	  could	  cut	  and	  what	  techniques	  to	  use.	  In	  this	  sense,	  villagers	  had	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  and	  regulate	  not	  only	  where	  they	  used	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  this	  phrase	  is	  based	  on	  wealth	  status.	  A	  wealthy	  farmer	  does	  not	  need	  to	  go	  “into	  the	  bush”	  during	  the	  dry	  season,	  since	  his	  adequate	  harvest	  provides	  food	  stocks	  and	  cash	  to	  meet	  household	  needs	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  next	  agricultural	  season.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  poor	  farmer	  cannot	  meet	  household	  needs	  through	  farming	  alone,	  and	  so	  must	  go	  to	  the	  bush	  to	  collect	  construction	  materials	  (e.g.	  thatch	  for	  hut	  roofs)	  and	  to	  cut	  wood	  to	  supplement	  his	  income.	  This	  phrase	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  women,	  since	  even	  in	  relatively	  wealthy	  households,	  women	  are	  expected	  to	  go	  to	  the	  bush	  daily	  to	  collect	  firewood	  for	  cooking.	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  forest	  resources,	  but	  how	  they	  did	  so.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  that	  new	  interactions	  and	  concerns	  with	  forest	  emerged	  not	  as	  rational	  individuals	  chose	  what	  they	  would	  believe,	  but	  as	  people	  interacted	  with	  forests	  and	  with	  one	  another	  in	  diverse	  ways.	  Villagers	  were	  subject	  to	  multiple	  pressures:	  threats	  of	  fines,	  monitoring	  by	  guards,	  village	  planning	  meetings,	  discussions	  with	  relatives,	  and	  complaints	  about	  outsiders	  stealing	  from	  the	  forest.	  Thus,	  environmental	  subjectivities	  arose	  first	  in	  relation	  to	  specific	  objects	  of	  affection:	  small,	  closely-­‐watched	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones.	  Later,	  some	  people’s	  concern	  for	  a	  particular	  forest	  expanded	  into	  a	  concern	  for	  ‘the	  environment’	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  they	  became	  more	  involved	  in	  forest	  regulation,	  some	  peasants	  began	  to	  identify	  and	  act	  as	  environmental	  activists.	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  mobilized	  in	  their	  communities	  discourses	  of	  environmental	  protection	  espoused	  by	  PAGERNA.	  They	  did	  more	  than	  publicly	  voice	  environmentalist	  orientations	  in	  pursuit	  of	  short-­‐term	  material	  or	  political	  gains.	  They	  began	  to	  think	  about	  ‘the	  environment’	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  to	  individual	  and	  collective	  well-­‐being.	  Abdoulaye	  Sène,	  a	  resident	  of	  one	  of	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  PAGERNA	  villages,	  made	  this	  logic	  clear	  in	  explaining	  why	  it	  was	  important	  to	  protect	  trees:	  	  “Trees	  bring	  value:	  kad,	  siddeem,	  neb-­‐neb	  [tree	  species].	  They	  are	  good	  for	  animals	   to	   eat.	   They	   can	   cure	   diseases.	   It’s	   the	   environnement42	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Sène	  uses	  the	  French	  word	  environnement	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  regulatory	  regime	  established	  under	  PAGERNA.	  Residents	  consistently	  used	  the	  French	  words	  environnement	  and	  forêt	  to	  refer	  not	  to	  natural	  resources	  in	  general,	  but	  to	  the	  modern	  practice	  of	  protecting	  them.	  Residents	  used	  the	  Wolof	  word	  àll	  (translated	  in	  English	  as	  ‘bush’)	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  non-­‐residential	  rural	  landscape	  in	  general	  (including	  fields	  and	  uncultivated	  areas)	  or	  to	  resources	  in	  the	  collective	  sense,	  such	  as	  trees	  and	  soil.	  The	  use	  of	  ‘environnement’	  to	  environmental	  regulation	  indicates	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  idea	  in	  development	  projects.	  Although	  PAGERNA	  went	  to	  some	  length	  to	  use	  Wolof	  to	  explain	  and	  justify	  the	  system	  of	  protection	  it	  was	  creating,	  people	  ultimately	  adopted	  the	  French	  term	  to	  describe	  it.	  This	  choice	  suggests	  the	  conceptual	  disconnect	  between	  the	  current	  community-­‐based	  management	  system	  and	  pre-­‐existing	  forms	  of	  natural	  resource	  management.	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  guarantees	   these	   trees…	  Many	   trees	   got	   to	   the	   point	   where	   they	   were	  almost	  gone.	  The	  environnement	  is	  why	  some	  trees	  are	  still	  here.	  If	  not	  for	  that	  they	  would	  all	  be	  cut.	  You	  couldn’t	  do	  anything	  about	  [the	  cutting].”	  Sène	  believes	  that	  the	  environmental	  regulation	  regime	  is	  crucial	  to	  maintaining	  the	  contributions	  made	  by	  trees	  (he	  means	  both	  trees	  in	  fields	  and	  those	  in	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones)	  to	  local	  livelihoods.	  Of	  course,	  everyone	  in	  the	  area	  knows	  that	  certain	  tree	  species	  are	  useful,	  but	  Sène	  focuses	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  environmental	  regulation	  and	  human	  well-­‐being.	  This	  focus	  implied	  a	  new	  logic	  for	  environmental	  protection:	  one	  that	  applied	  not	  only	  in	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  generating	  immediate	  returns,	  but	  to	  the	  whole	  landscape	  and	  with	  a	  view	  to	  long-­‐term	  well-­‐being.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  nine-­‐year	  lifespan,	  PAGERNA	  catalyzed	  profound	  changes	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  Kaolack	  residents	  and	  forest	  resources.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  field	  activities	  in	  2002,	  residents	  of	  intervention	  districts	  were	  deeply	  involved	  in	  forest	  regulation.	  Restrictions	  had	  reached	  a	  degree	  never	  seen	  in	  Senegal’s	  history;	  they	  had	  successfully	  excluded	  not	  just	  commercial	  exploitation,	  but	  also	  subsistence	  use43	  in	  a	  patchwork	  of	  local	  protected	  zones.	  This	  level	  of	  regulation	  was	  possible	  because	  a	  new	  group	  of	  environmental	  activists	  was	  monitoring	  resource	  use,	  enforcing	  restrictions,	  and	  espousing	  the	  values	  of	  protection.	  Some	  residents	  had	  come	  to	  value	  environmental	  resources	  in	  ways	  they	  had	  not	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  to	  see	  the	  protection	  of	  these	  resources	  as	  important	  for	  human	  well-­‐being.	  However,	  to	  end	  the	  story	  here,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  project,	  would	  be	  to	  miss	  a	  crucial	  piece	  of	  its	  legacy.	  Clearly,	  the	  activities	  of	  development	  projects	  like	  PAGERNA	  play	  a	  role	  in	  local	  environmental	  governance;	  yet	  they	  represent	  only	  short-­‐lived	  catalysts	  embedded	  in	  an	  ongoing	  history.	  Thus,	  we	  must	  ask:	  What	  happened	  after	  project	  staff	  packed	  up	  and	  went	  home?	  What	  did	  the	  local	  residents	  and	  government	  officials	  do	  with	  the	  institutions	  and	  practices	  the	  project	  left	  behind?	  In	  what	  ways	  did	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  There	  are	  exceptions;	  authorities	  had	  attempted	  to	  enforce	  total	  restriction	  in	  national	  parks	  and	  private	  plantations.	  
	   	  	   46	  environment	  governance	  continue	  to	  change?	  We	  shall	  see	  in	  Chapter	  5	  that	  although	  PAGERNA	  set	  the	  stage,	  other	  actors	  modified	  the	  forest	  governance	  script	  substantially	  after	  the	  project’s	  close.	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5. AFTER THE PROJECT: INTIMATE GOVERNMENT 
At	  the	  time	  I	  arrived	  in	  Kaolack	  to	  conduct	  field	  research	  in	  May	  2010,	  PAGERNA	  had	  been	  absent	  for	  about	  eight	  years.	  Yet	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  project	  was	  clearly	  visible.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  protected	  zones	  it	  had	  established	  still	  received	  a	  measure	  of	  protection.	  In	  fact,	  the	  rural	  council	  in	  at	  least	  one	  district	  had	  delimited	  a	  number	  of	  new	  protected	  zones	  after	  the	  project’s	  close.	  Yet	  the	  management	  regime	  present	  in	  2010	  was	  also	  substantially	  different	  from	  the	  one	  envisioned	  by	  PAGERNA	  ten	  years	  earlier.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  regime	  in	  2010	  resembled	  neither	  the	  patchwork	  of	  autonomous	  self-­‐governing	  communities	  envisioned	  in	  the	  project’s	  early	  phase,	  nor	  the	  empowered	  local	  government	  framework	  pursued	  in	  its	  latter	  efforts.	  Instead,	  village	  authorities,	  rural	  councilors,	  and	  forest	  service	  agents	  began	  to	  work	  together	  much	  more	  closely	  than	  before.	  Over	  time,	  they	  developed	  shared	  interests	  and	  collaborative	  relationships.	  This	  new	  relationship	  between	  local	  authorities	  and	  state	  bureaucrats	  was	  possible	  because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  environmental	  activists	  described	  above.	  I	  use	  Agrawal’s	  term	  ‘intimate	  government’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  system	  of	  governance	  built	  from	  these	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  community	  authorities	  (2005b).	  In	  Kaolack,	  intimate	  government	  was	  more	  strict,	  consistent,	  and	  internalized	  than	  centralized	  regulation	  had	  been.	  However,	  it	  also	  had	  consequences	  that	  neither	  PAGERNA	  nor	  the	  forest	  service	  had	  foreseen:	  it	  destabilized	  the	  long-­‐standing	  stalemate	  between	  regulation	  and	  resistance.	  Concern	  for	  environmental	  protection	  undermined	  the	  rural	  solidarity	  on	  which	  resistance	  had	  depended,	  dividing	  villages	  from	  one	  another.	  In	  villages	  that	  actively	  participated	  in	  forest	  protection,	  most	  residents	  acquiesced	  to	  self-­‐monitoring	  and	  obeyed	  restrictions.	  In	  non-­‐participating	  villages,	  residents	  continued	  to	  break	  the	  rules.	  However,	  the	  erosion	  of	  inter-­‐village	  solidarity	  meant	  that	  rule-­‐breakers	  were	  increasingly	  vilified	  and	  punished.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  how	  intimate	  government	  came	  about	  and	  how	  it	  touched	  different	  social	  groups.	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From Usurpers to Collaborators: Village Guards and Foresters 
PAGERNA	  initially	  attempted	  to	  establish	  a	  regulatory	  system	  parallel	  to	  the	  forest	  service	  in	  which	  monitoring,	  enforcement,	  and	  sanctioning	  would	  be	  controlled	  at	  the	  local	  level.44	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  forest	  service	  perceived	  a	  parallel	  system	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  control	  of	  forests.	  It	  appeared	  as	  though	  village	  guards,	  working	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  locally-­‐elaborated	  codes,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  persecute	  rule-­‐breakers	  at	  their	  own	  discretion.	  Sanctions	  would	  be	  settled	  –	  and	  fines	  collected	  –	  at	  the	  village	  level,	  mediated	  by	  village	  chiefs	  and	  rural	  councilors.	  This	  local	  system	  threatened	  the	  forest	  service	  on	  several	  levels:	  first,	  it	  jeopardized	  central	  collection	  of	  fines,	  a	  not	  insubstantial	  source	  of	  forest	  service	  revenue.	  More	  significantly,	  the	  independence	  of	  a	  community-­‐based	  system	  would	  challenge	  the	  central	  state’s	  control	  over	  law	  enforcement	  on	  its	  national	  territory.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  threats,	  the	  forestry	  administration	  quickly	  moved	  to	  block	  the	  resource	  management	  approach	  propagated	  by	  PAGERNA,	  and	  to	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  village	  guards	  who	  were	  at	  the	  approach’s	  core.45	  PAGERNA’s	  problems	  with	  the	  forest	  service	  began	  early.	  During	  its	  first	  year,	  project	  managers	  found	  themselves	  frequently	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  national	  coordinator,	  a	  forester	  charged	  with	  representing	  the	  Senegalese	  government.	  While	  project	  managers	  in	  Kaolack	  city	  struggled	  to	  find	  a	  national	  coordinator	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  their	  approach,	  forest	  service	  agents	  in	  rural	  districts	  also	  began	  resisting	  the	  project.	  They	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  PAGERNA	  meetings	  and	  training	  sessions,	  complaining	  that	  they	  were	  being	  replaced	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  discussion	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  desirability	  of	  either	  local-­‐level	  or	  centralized	  sanctioning	  powers.	  Rather,	  I	  seek	  to	  elucidate	  the	  logic	  underlying	  the	  positions	  of	  administrators,	  project	  managers,	  and	  village	  authorities.	  
45	  Senegalese	  law	  supports	  the	  forest	  service’s	  position.	  Only	  sworn	  state	  agents	  (agents	  
assermentés)	  have	  legal	  authority	  to	  make	  arrests.	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  village	  guards.46	  Although	  PAGERNA	  was	  able	  to	  work	  around	  local	  resistance	  to	  conduct	  village	  activities,	  it	  ran	  into	  further	  problems	  as	  it	  attempted	  to	  have	  rural	  councils	  pass	  local	  environmental	  conventions.	  Forest	  service	  administrators	  blocked	  conventions	  in	  at	  least	  one	  district.	  Although	  the	  rural	  council	  had	  deliberated	  and	  signed	  the	  convention,	  the	  head	  forester	  at	  the	  department	  level	  refused	  to	  provide	  technical	  approval	  for	  the	  plan.	  Again,	  PAGERNA	  worked	  around	  resistance,	  helping	  the	  rural	  council	  to	  appeal	  directly	  to	  the	  regional	  forest	  service	  office	  for	  approval.	  However,	  although	  PAGERNA	  managed	  to	  work	  around	  one-­‐time	  blockages	  to	  particular	  activities,	  forest	  service	  resistance	  mounted.	  Gradually,	  the	  project	  began	  to	  back	  away	  from	  its	  initial	  approach.	  In	  response	  to	  objections	  to	  its	  local	  conventions,	  PAGERNA	  relabeled	  and	  repurposed	  these	  documents,	  removing	  references	  to	  local	  fines	  and	  village	  guard	  powers,	  and	  instead	  simply	  citing	  penalties	  prescribed	  by	  the	  forest	  code.47	  While	  I	  do	  not	  have	  evidence	  of	  pressure	  from	  national-­‐level	  administration,	  given	  how	  sharply	  PAGERNA	  revised	  its	  approach	  after	  the	  first	  few	  years,	  high-­‐level	  pressure	  is	  not	  unimaginable.	  The	  project	  accepted	  a	  diminished	  role	  for	  villagers	  and	  rural	  councilors	  –	  they	  were	  relegated	  to	  essentially	  the	  same	  position	  they	  had	  occupied	  prior	  to	  the	  project	  within	  the	  contentieux	  system.	  Yet	  the	  village	  regulation	  that	  PAGERNA	  had	  set	  into	  motion	  was	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  reign	  in.	  In	  many	  villages,	  guards	  continued	  to	  persecute	  infractions	  and	  levy	  local	  fines.	  Instead	  of	  erasing	  local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Agents	  were	  also	  upset	  about	  losing	  an	  important	  source	  of	  income:	  the	  per	  diems	  paid	  by	  development	  projects	  to	  secure	  their	  cooperation.	  PAGERNA	  managers	  categorically	  refused	  to	  pay	  this	  fee,	  arguing	  that	  this	  was	  the	  Senegalese	  government’s	  responsibility.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  national	  coordinator	  convinced	  the	  government	  to	  pay	  the	  per	  diems.	  
47	  PAGERNA	  renamed	  its	  local	  conventions	  twice	  in	  response	  to	  legal	  challenges	  from	  the	  forestry	  administration.	  Initially	  named	  ‘interior	  regulations’	  (règlements	  intérieurs),	  the	  project	  renamed	  them	  ‘codes	  of	  conduct’	  (codes	  de	  conduite),	  and	  finally	  ‘local	  conventions’	  (conventions	  locales).	  The	  contents	  of	  rural	  communities’	  documents	  differ	  slightly.	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  involvement	  in	  regulation,	  forest	  service	  contestation	  diverted	  and	  channeled	  it.	  What	  emerged	  were	  practices	  that	  enmeshed	  community	  and	  state	  regulators.	  In	  response	  to	  legal	  challenges	  to	  community-­‐based	  management,	  village	  guards	  and	  rural	  councilors	  sought	  both	  to	  justify	  their	  legitimacy	  as	  regulators,	  and	  to	  form	  collaborative	  relationships	  with	  foresters.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  they	  appealed	  to	  a	  logic	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  Alassane	  Sarr,	  president	  of	  the	  environmental	  commission	  in	  one	  of	  PAGERNA’s	  first	  interventions	  districts,	  coordinated	  the	  network	  of	  village	  guards	  and	  oversaw	  enforcement	  and	  exploitation	  of	  protected	  zones.	  Sarr	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  establishing	  and	  defending	  local	  enforcement	  in	  his	  district.	  In	  the	  following	  quote,	  Sarr	  describes	  how	  he	  responded	  to	  the	  departmental	  forestry	  official’s	  refusal	  to	  sign	  the	  local	  convention:	  The	   forest	   service	   thinks	   that	   the	  population	   is	   taking	  over	   the	  work	  of	  the	  state.	  But	  it’s	  not	  that.	  I	  want	  them	  to	  help	  out	  until	  all	  of	  us	  are	  forest	  service	   agents	   ourselves.	   No	   one	   can	   say	   we	   [need]	   a	   card48	  to	   catch	  someone…	  The	   Inspector	   [at	   the	   department	   office]	   refused	   to	   sign	   the	  local	  convention.	  But	   the	  2000	  [fine]49	  is	   to	  keep	  among	  us	  –	   that’s	  why	  we	  do	   it.	  The	   forest	  service	  does	   the	  real	   fines.	   I	   took	   the	  convention	   to	  Fatick,50	  where	   the	   [regional	   inspector]	   signed	   it.	  The	   sous-­‐préfet	   signed	  it.	  We	  passed	  through	  it.	  It	  was	  painful…	  The	  inspector	  said	  there	  was	  no	  question	  of	  us	  taking	  our	  own	  fines.	  But	  I	  knew	  that	  the	  fines	  were	  only	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  i.e.	  an	  identity	  card.	  In	  its	  initial	  phase,	  PAGERNA	  distributed	  identity	  cards	  to	  some	  village	  guards.	  This	  was	  another	  of	  the	  forest	  service’s	  central	  objections,	  and	  PAGERNA	  later	  ceased	  distributing	  ID	  cards.	  
49	  The	  2000	  fcfa	  (4	  U.S.	  dollar)	  is	  a	  local	  fine,	  since	  the	  forest	  code	  does	  not	  include	  fines	  this	  small.	  
50	  The	  district,	  although	  closer	  to	  Kaolack	  city,	  falls	  in	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  of	  Fatick	  Region.	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  create	  fear	  inside	  the	  community.	  People	  who	  can’t	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  2000	  won’t	  cut.	  It’s	  not	  the	  forest	  service	  that	  owns	  the	  forest.	  We	  own	  it.	  	  Sarr	  narrates	  how	  he	  went	  over	  the	  head	  of	  the	  departmental	  inspector	  to	  get	  the	  local	  convention	  signed	  by	  the	  regional	  inspector.	  The	  regional	  inspector,	  however,	  warns	  that	  local	  fines	  cannot	  be	  legally	  applied.	  Yet,	  Sarr	  does	  not	  admit	  that	  the	  rural	  council	  has	  been	  forced	  to	  drop	  them.	  He	  continues	  to	  argue	  for	  their	  application	  as	  a	  way	  to	  suppress	  rule-­‐breaking.	  Sarr’s	  key	  justification	  for	  local	  regulation	  is	  its	  effectiveness	  at	  reducing	  infractions.	  In	  another	  interview,	  Sarr	  explains:	  “The	  Forest	  Service	  has	  been	  around	  since	  Independence...	  They	  were	  here	  during	  the	  period	  when	  the	  whole	  environment	  in	  Senegal	  was	  destroyed.”	  For	  Sarr,	  the	  forest	  service	  was	  incapable	  of	  protecting	  forests	  through	  centralized	  regulation,	  leaving	  rural	  councils	  and	  village	  guards	  the	  responsibility	  to	  assure	  protection.	  Yet	  local	  authorities	  cannot	  undertake	  this	  task	  alone;	  they	  need	  the	  forest	  service	  to	  issue	  permits,	  levy	  large	  fines,	  and	  help	  spread	  regulatory	  compliance	  and	  environmentalist	  values	  throughout	  the	  local	  population.	  Sarr	  outlines	  a	  new	  partnership:	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  more	  effectively	  protecting	  the	  environment,	  villagers,	  rural	  councilors,	  and	  forest	  service	  agents	  must	  work	  together,	  but	  with	  differentiated	  responsibilities.	  Now	  pursuing	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  forest	  protection,	  local	  authorities	  and	  foresters	  began	  to	  collaborate	  and	  negotiated	  new	  practices	  for	  dealing	  with	  infractions.	  Local	  guards	  continue	  to	  monitor	  protected	  zones	  and	  confront	  rule-­‐breakers.	  But	  whereas	  before	  they	  often	  went	  through	  village	  mediation,	  post-­‐PAGERNA	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  involve	  the	  local	  forest	  agent.	  No	  longer	  did	  infractions	  resemble	  the	  early	  days	  of	  community	  management,	  when	  chiefs’	  wives	  were	  caught	  gathering	  firewood	  or	  unripe	  fruits.	  More	  and	  more,	  rule-­‐breakers	  came	  from	  neighboring	  villages	  and	  urban	  areas	  (this	  trend	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  When	  guards	  apprehended	  rule-­‐breaker	  considered	  to	  be	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  outsiders,	  or	  witnessed	  a	  “serious	  infraction”51	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  try	  to	  resolve	  the	  matter	  through	  village	  authorities	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  call	  the	  forest	  service	  agent.	  These	  trends	  are	  reflected	  in	  reports	  of	  recent	  infractions.	  Of	  the	  18	  rule-­‐breaking	  incidents	  spontaneously	  reported	  during	  interviews,	  10	  were	  channeled	  to	  the	  local	  forest	  agent	  (Table	  2).	  Only	  6	  were	  dealt	  with	  at	  the	  village	  or	  rural	  council	  level.52	  	  Regulation	  is	  thus	  trending	  towards	  the	  simultaneous	  involvement	  of	  village	  guards	  and	  forest	  service	  agents.	  Although	  local	  guarding	  has	  no	  basis	  in	  law,	  it	  continues	  in	  practice,	  and	  increasingly	  draws	  on	  the	  forest	  service	  agent	  for	  support.	  Yet	  this	  trend	  represents	  not	  simply	  the	  forest	  service	  recolonizing	  a	  domain	  of	  authority	  lost	  due	  to	  community-­‐based	  management.	  Foresters,	  too,	  were	  drawn	  into	  relationships	  with	  local	  authorities.	  In	  early	  2009,	  a	  new	  forestry	  agent	  was	  assigned	  to	  the	  study	  district.	  The	  agent	  was	  Sekou	  Coly,	  a	  young	  man	  from	  Casamance53	  taking	  up	  his	  first	  field	  post.	  In	  an	  interview,	  Coly	  described	  how	  different	  the	  situation	  at	  his	  post	  was	  from	  what	  he	  had	  been	  taught	  at	  forestry	  school:	  while	  his	  training	  had	  touched	  on	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones,	  he	  had	  not	  been	  taught	  about	  village-­‐	  and	  council-­‐level	  organization.	  “I	  found	  things	  well	  organized	  here.	  My	  tasks	  are	  reduced.	  They	  know	  that	  the	  forest	  is	  theirs.	  They	  guard	  it	  for	  themselves...	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Infractions	  that	  are	  considered	  serious	  by	  both	  local	  authorities	  and	  the	  forest	  service	  include	  cutting	  down	  entire	  trees	  (any	  species	  besides	  fast-­‐growing	  ngeer	  and	  ratt);	  harvesting	  ngeer	  and	  
ratt	  in	  large	  quantities	  (outside	  of	  council-­‐regulated	  exploitation);	  and	  lopping	  more	  than	  one	  or	  two	  branches,	  especially	  on	  kadd	  trees,	  whose	  pods	  can	  be	  collected	  and	  sold	  as	  animal	  fodder.	  
52	  In	  one	  of	  the	  remaining	  two	  rule-­‐breaking	  instances,	  the	  rule-­‐breaker	  escaped	  after	  being	  spotted;	  in	  the	  other,	  the	  respondent	  did	  not	  know	  whether	  the	  forest	  agent	  became	  involved	  after	  the	  incident	  was	  reported	  to	  the	  rural	  council.	  
53	  Casamance	  is	  the	  narrow	  sliver	  of	  Senegalese	  territory	  located	  between	  The	  Gambia	  and	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.	  The	  presence	  of	  Casamançais	  foresters	  in	  Sine-­‐Saloum	  reflects	  the	  forest	  service	  policy	  of	  posting	  agents	  outside	  their	  home	  region,	  in	  order	  to	  discourage	  them	  from	  forming	  kinship-­‐based	  relations	  with	  local	  residents.	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  read	  the	  documents	  and	  saw	  how	  PAGERNA	  worked.”	  What	  Coly	  described	  is	  a	  process	  of	  socialization	  through	  which	  he	  learned	  how	  to	  enforce	  forest	  regulation	  in	  collaboration	  with	  local	  managers.	  One	  result	  of	  this	  socialization	  was	  that	  Coly’s	  perspective	  on	  community	  management	  was	  considerably	  more	  favorable	  than	  that	  of	  many	  forestry	  administrators.	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  local	  fines,	  Coly	  responded	  that,	  although	  this	  system	  should	  be	  “updated,”	  it	  was	  the	  most	  appropriate	  to	  “local	  realities.”	  In	  fact,	  he	  argued,	  what	  was	  needed	  were	  more	  village	  guards	  and	  more	  oversight	  by	  the	  rural	  council:	  	  Now	  people	  say	  it’s	  the	  [forest	  service]	  agent’s	  job	  to	  guard.	  But	  I	  can’t	  do	  this	  –	   it’s	   not	   a	   single	   site	   to	   protect.	   I	   only	   have	  my	  moto	   –	   I	   can’t	   confiscate	  wood	  if	  people	  abandon	  it	  and	  run.	  The	   rural	   council	   should	   redynamize	   the	   CAC’s	   [inter-­‐village	   coordination	  bodies].	  The	  council	  hasn’t	  made	  an	  effort.	   If	   I	   issue	  a	  fine,	  70%	  goes	  to	  the	  council.	  The	  council	  needs	  to	  do	  natural	  resource	  management.	  Coly	  admitted	  that	  all	  the	  infractions	  he	  heard	  about	  were	  reported	  to	  him	  by	  villagers.	  Without	  their	  help,	  he	  would	  be	  ineffective	  at	  enforcing	  forestry	  regulation.	  Coly	  also	  maintained	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  several	  rural	  councilors,	  frequently	  talking	  to	  them	  on	  the	  phone	  and	  attending	  meetings	  at	  the	  rural	  council	  office.	  In	  turn,	  the	  rural	  council	  allocated	  5%	  of	  revenues	  from	  protected	  zones	  to	  a	  small	  monthly	  fuel	  budget	  for	  Coly.	  This	  example	  shows	  how	  forest	  service	  agents	  formed	  relationships	  not	  just	  with	  village	  guards	  but	  with	  rural	  councils.	  All	  three	  parties	  began	  to	  collaborate	  with	  and	  depend	  on	  one	  another	  to	  carry	  out	  environmental	  regulation.	  Closer	  relationships	  among	  foresters,	  village	  guards,	  and	  rural	  councilors	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  these	  relationships	  followed	  official	  procedures.	  That	  procedures	  and	  practices	  were	  incongruent	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  prior	  situation	  under	  centralized	  forest	  management.	  Yet	  what	  is	  different	  today	  is	  that	  foresters	  deviate	  from	  procedure	  in	  ways	  that	  provide	  support	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  local	  regulatory	  authorities.	  In	  the	  case	  of	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  agent	  Coly,	  he	  claimed	  to	  prefer	  unofficial	  village	  negotiations	  –	  in	  which	  he	  often	  participated	  –	  over	  formal	  sanction.	  The	  small	  number	  of	  procès	  verbal	  he	  issued	  (5	  in	  2009)	  attests	  to	  how	  infrequently	  Coly	  undertakes	  formal	  sanctions	  (Table	  3).	  Furthermore,	  deviation	  from	  procedures	  also	  occurred	  in	  other	  regulatory	  practices.	  For	  example,	  when	  approving	  harvests	  in	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones,	  Coly	  often	  asked	  the	  president	  of	  the	  environmental	  commission	  to	  appear	  in	  his	  place.	  The	  large	  number	  of	  village	  requests	  to	  cut	  firewood	  in	  protected	  zones	  mean	  that	  Coly	  could	  not	  inspect	  all	  sites.	  In	  villages	  that	  have	  already	  performed	  several	  cuts,	  Coly	  decided	  that	  no	  inspection	  is	  necessary.	  The	  forest	  code	  and	  local	  conventions,	  however,	  specify	  that	  forest	  service	  agents	  must	  inspect	  management	  sites	  prior	  to	  every	  harvest.	  Although	  the	  deviation	  is	  minor,	  it	  undermines	  one	  of	  the	  tacit	  purposes	  of	  management	  plans:	  to	  restrain	  the	  exercise	  of	  rural	  councils’	  powers	  to	  manage	  forests.	  What	  is	  interesting	  here	  is	  that	  Coly	  participated	  in	  and	  validated	  precisely	  the	  local	  management	  system	  that	  many	  of	  his	  superiors	  opposed.	  While	  the	  incidents	  described	  reflect	  the	  experiences	  of	  one	  agent,	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  not	  based	  on	  the	  “goodwill”	  of	  one	  individual	  alone.	  In	  other	  districts	  too,	  close	  relationships	  developed	  between	  local	  environmental	  activists	  and	  forest	  service	  agents.	  Furthermore,	  forestry	  administrators	  themselves	  admitted	  candidly	  that	  while	  community	  regulators	  rarely	  follow	  procedures,	  they	  are	  more	  effective	  regulators	  than	  forest	  service	  agents	  alone.	  Thus,	  the	  gap	  between	  forestry	  law	  and	  practice,	  although	  not	  unique	  to	  today’s	  regime	  of	  intimate	  government,	  produced	  a	  new	  effect:	  it	  lent	  legitimacy	  to	  local	  authorities.	  The	  above	  discussion	  shows	  that	  forest	  regulation	  in	  Koalack	  came	  to	  be	  based	  on	  intimate	  government:	  close	  interaction,	  shared	  interests,	  and	  mutual	  reliance	  among	  village	  authorities,	  rural	  councilors,	  and	  forest	  service	  agents.	  Initially,	  the	  forest	  service	  administration	  challenged	  the	  legal	  basis	  of	  community-­‐based	  management,	  but	  local	  actors	  responded	  by	  developing	  new	  forms	  of	  practice	  and	  collaboration	  that	  differed	  substantially	  from	  formal	  procedures.	  Although	  the	  forest	  service	  undermined	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  local	  regulation,	  it	  was	  not	  able	  to	  erode	  its	  legitimacy	  in	  practice.	  Most	  critical	  to	  the	  intimate	  government	  regime	  were	  the	  actions	  of	  village-­‐based	  environmental	  activists,	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  who	  appealed	  to	  forest	  agents	  based	  on	  new	  environmentalist	  orientations,	  and	  were	  in	  turn	  relied	  upon	  by	  foresters	  to	  enforce	  regulations.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  however,	  a	  stable	  regime	  of	  intimate	  government	  did	  not	  require	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  rural	  residents	  adopt	  strong	  support	  for	  environmental	  protection.	  	  
Trading Solidarity for Environmentalism 
Thus	  far,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  some	  residents	  became	  active	  in	  community-­‐based	  management,	  developed	  new	  environmentalist	  values,	  and	  began	  to	  collaborate	  with	  forest	  service	  agents.	  However,	  the	  image	  of	  a	  community	  wholly	  converted	  over	  to	  environmentalism	  is	  a	  false	  one.	  Many	  residents	  remain	  unconvinced	  by	  the	  ideology	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  Rather	  than	  erasing	  differences,	  environmental	  regulation	  lay	  down	  new	  dividing	  lines	  over	  an	  already	  differentiated	  society.	  Yet	  despite	  these	  divisions,	  the	  regime	  of	  intimate	  government	  became	  stricter	  and	  more	  effective	  than	  centralized	  regulation	  had	  been.	  This	  final	  section	  of	  the	  thesis	  explores	  how	  intimate	  government	  was	  so	  successful	  despite	  the	  incomplete	  incorporation	  of	  residents,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  regime	  affected	  different	  groups	  of	  residents.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  intimate	  government	  was	  successful	  because	  it	  engendered	  not	  only	  commitment,	  but	  also	  acquiescence.	  Furthermore,	  villages’	  differing	  involvement	  in	  practices	  of	  regulation	  produced	  an	  uneven	  spatial	  pattern	  of	  subjectivities.	  In	  villages	  where	  participation	  in	  regulatory	  practices	  was	  most	  intense,	  acquiescers	  monitored	  and	  restricted	  their	  own	  activities,	  reducing	  the	  need	  for	  enforcement.	  In	  zones	  where	  there	  had	  been	  fewer	  protection	  activities,	  residents	  continued	  to	  break	  forest	  restrictions.	  However,	  the	  inter-­‐village	  solidarity	  that	  had	  once	  allowed	  these	  rule-­‐breakers	  to	  resist	  forestry	  regulations	  was	  eroding.	  Rule-­‐breakers	  found	  themselves	  persecuted	  by	  guards	  from	  neighboring	  villages	  and	  foresters	  alike.	  In	  this	  sense,	  rural	  society	  traded	  solidarity	  for	  environmentalism.	  While	  the	  loss	  of	  solidarity	  made	  intimate	  government	  effective	  at	  regulating	  forests,	  it	  also	  imposed	  costs	  on	  the	  poor.	  This	  section	  explores	  the	  structure	  and	  effects	  of	  intimate	  government.	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  We	  first	  ask	  how	  a	  majority	  of	  residents	  came	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  intimate	  government.	  Acquiescers	  were	  different	  from	  activists;	  they	  did	  not	  actively	  enforce	  regulation,	  confront	  rule-­‐breakers,	  or	  collaborate	  directly	  with	  the	  forest	  service.54	  They	  were	  not	  committed	  to	  values	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  Instead,	  acquiescers	  restrained	  their	  forest	  use	  because	  they	  internalized	  the	  monitoring	  and	  regulation	  to	  which	  they	  were	  subjected.	  To	  understand	  this	  process,	  we	  briefly	  consider	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ubiquitous	  forest	  uses	  in	  Kaolack:	  women	  collecting	  firewood	  for	  household	  use.	  Firewood	  collection	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  activities	  most	  restricted	  by	  forest	  protection,55	  yet	  women	  generally	  complied	  with	  restrictions.	  Tabara	  Mbakhoume,	  a	  resident	  of	  a	  village	  with	  several	  protected	  areas,	  explained	  why:	  “Because	  they	  will	  catch	  you	  and	  make	  you	  pay	  -­‐	  that’s	  why	  many	  people	  don’t	  dare	  to	  cut	  trees.”	  In	  other	  words,	  women	  responded	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  sanction.	  But	  there	  is	  more	  to	  acquiescence	  than	  this;	  sanctioning	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  women’s	  compliance.	  While	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  caught	  was	  high	  in	  the	  initial	  days	  of	  protection,	  monitoring	  pressure	  later	  dropped	  off.	  Yet	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  corresponding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Categorizing	  residents	  as	  managers,	  acquiescers,	  and	  rejectors	  is	  an	  organizational	  trick	  useful	  for	  revealing	  how	  intimate	  government	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  differing	  subjectivities.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  trick	  is	  not	  to	  exclude	  other	  meaningful	  social	  divisions,	  nor	  to	  hide	  differentiation	  within	  groups.	  Indeed,	  within	  each	  group,	  levels	  of	  involvement,	  acquiescence,	  and	  resistance	  varied.	  
55	  In	  interviews,	  one	  of	  women’s	  main	  complaints	  was	  that	  they	  must	  travel	  farther	  to	  find	  firewood	  compared	  to	  the	  past.	  Many	  women	  reported	  spending	  two	  to	  three	  hours	  collecting	  every	  two	  days.	  Even	  if	  wood	  is	  available	  on	  the	  landscape,	  it	  is	  of	  little	  use	  if	  it	  is	  more	  than	  two	  kilometers	  from	  the	  village.	  The	  village	  protected	  zones	  have	  contributed	  to	  this	  scarcity.	  However,	  in	  villages	  that	  are	  able	  to	  exploit	  them,	  these	  zones	  provide	  a	  stock	  of	  high-­‐quality	  firewood	  that	  can	  last	  households	  the	  three-­‐month	  rainy	  season,	  when	  both	  wood	  and	  women’s	  time	  are	  at	  their	  scarcest.	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  increase	  in	  illegal	  firewood	  gathering	  in	  protected	  zones.56	  The	  high	  degree	  of	  compliance	  was	  the	  result	  of	  women	  –	  individually	  and	  collectively	  –	  monitoring	  and	  regulating	  themselves	  (Foucault	  1977).	  As	  women	  became	  attentive	  to	  whether	  their	  activities	  would	  be	  considered	  ‘environmentally	  destructive,’	  they	  began	  to	  avoid	  illegal	  practices	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  being	  monitored.	  Self-­‐regulation	  was	  also	  self-­‐reinforcing.	  Once	  the	  majority	  of	  residents	  began	  to	  comply,	  collecting	  firewood	  in	  a	  protected	  area	  became	  a	  deviant	  act	  that	  appeared	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  hard-­‐won	  fruits	  of	  community	  protection.	  Thus	  women	  began	  to	  monitor	  more	  closely	  both	  themselves	  and	  one	  another.	  Acquiescers	  internalized	  forest	  restrictions	  to	  the	  point	  that	  village	  guards	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  watch	  them	  strictly.	  Self-­‐monitoring	  in	  turn	  both	  strengthened	  intimate	  government	  and	  distributed	  its	  effects	  unevenly	  across	  space.	  The	  combination	  of	  environmental	  activism	  and	  acquiescence	  produced	  an	  uneven	  pattern	  of	  compliance	  and	  persecution	  within	  a	  stronger	  and	  stricter	  regulatory	  regime.	  The	  infractions	  reported	  by	  residents	  of	  participating	  villages	  reflect	  a	  trend	  towards	  persecuting	  outsiders:	  16	  of	  the	  18	  reported	  infractions	  were	  committed	  by	  people	  from	  outside	  the	  village	  in	  which	  they	  were	  caught	  (Table	  2).57	  The	  shift	  towards	  persecuting	  outsiders	  can	  be	  understood	  with	  respect	  to	  bonds	  of	  solidarity	  among	  different	  residents.	  Within	  participating	  villages,	  close	  kinship	  ties	  between	  environmental	  activists	  and	  other	  residents	  may	  have	  reinforced	  acquiesce.	  Since	  the	  number	  of	  infractions	  committed	  by	  residents	  declined	  to	  nearly	  zero,	  authorities	  rarely	  faced	  situations	  where	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  impose	  harsh	  sanctions	  on	  close	  relatives.	  Thus	  they	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  commitments	  to	  kin	  and	  commitments	  to	  environmentalist	  values.	  Instead,	  these	  two	  sets	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Indeed,	  in	  certain	  villages	  where	  monitoring	  was	  never	  intense,	  women	  continue	  to	  cut	  in	  protected	  zones.	  In	  the	  majority	  of	  protected	  zones,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  compliance	  among	  women.	  
57	  In	  the	  one	  reported	  case	  in	  which	  a	  woman	  from	  the	  participating	  village	  was	  caught,	  the	  guard	  decided	  to	  let	  her	  off	  with	  a	  warning.	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  of	  norms	  became	  interwoven.	  In	  contrast,	  between-­‐village	  ties	  of	  solidarity	  were	  snapped	  by	  commitments	  to	  environmental	  protection.	  Residents	  of	  participating	  villages	  have	  abandoned	  their	  support	  for	  rule-­‐breakers	  from	  outside	  the	  village.	  As	  indicated	  by	  reports	  of	  infractions,	  participants	  often	  helped	  to	  persecute	  outsiders’	  illegal	  activities.	  Furthermore,	  they	  justified	  these	  practices	  with	  reference	  to	  environmentalist	  and	  exclusionary	  logics.	  When	  asked	  how	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  persecute	  rule-­‐breakers	  who	  were	  poor	  farmers,	  residents	  of	  participating	  villages	  insisted	  that	  rule-­‐breaking	  could	  not	  be	  tolerated:	  ‘If	  we	  let	  one	  person	  steal	  today,	  tomorrow	  someone	  else	  will	  come,	  until	  the	  forest	  is	  ruined,’	  was	  a	  common	  refrain.58	  In	  addition,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  inter-­‐village	  solidarity	  eroded,	  forest	  regulation	  became	  stricter	  and	  more	  consistent	  than	  before,	  and	  the	  resistance	  strategies	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  became	  decidedly	  less	  effective.	  Not	  only	  were	  illegal	  practices	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  reported,	  sanctions	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  applied	  consistently.	  Village	  guards,	  rural	  councilors,	  and	  forest	  service	  agents	  all	  reported	  that	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  forgive	  rule-­‐breakers	  or	  to	  make	  “arrangements.”	  Supporting	  these	  claims,	  residents	  reported	  that	  forest	  service	  agents	  were	  more	  “correct”	  (i.e.	  less	  likely	  to	  accept	  bribes)	  and	  stricter	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  Of	  course,	  as	  detailed	  above,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  forest	  agents	  apply	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law.	  Instead,	  their	  collaboration	  with	  village	  authorities	  and	  councilors	  –	  who	  were	  now	  more	  committed	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  forest	  regulation	  –	  meant	  that	  villagers	  expected	  agents	  to	  levy	  a	  fine	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  the	  restrictions	  that	  he	  represented.	  Thus,	  intimate	  government	  affected	  villages	  unevenly:	  while	  some	  complied,	  others	  were	  subject	  to	  stricter	  and	  more	  consistent	  persecution	  than	  before.	  We	  now	  briefly	  consider	  one	  such	  persecuted	  village.	  	  The	  farming	  hamlet	  of	  Niakadola	  was	  hit	  especially	  hard	  by	  a	  regime	  of	  harsher	  sanctions	  under	  intimate	  government.	  All	  of	  the	  village’s	  150	  or	  so	  residents	  are	  ethnically	  Wolof,	  and	  they	  have	  few	  kinship	  ties	  to	  more	  powerful	  villages	  in	  the	  rural	  community.	  The	  village	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Almost	  all	  respondents	  (including	  rule-­‐breakers	  themselves)	  used	  the	  word	  ‘steal’	  (sacc)	  to	  refer	  to	  illegal	  resource	  use.	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  has	  no	  representative	  on	  the	  rural	  council,59	  and	  even	  casual	  inspection	  reveals	  it	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  in	  the	  district.	  Residents	  are	  especially	  reliant	  on	  tree	  cutting	  and	  clandestine	  charcoal	  making,	  with	  one	  member	  in	  almost	  every	  household	  cutting	  trees	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  even	  during	  periods	  of	  relative	  ‘normalcy.’	  Niakadola	  was	  never	  implicated	  in	  PAGERNA’s	  activities,	  and	  never	  received	  training,	  established	  a	  protected	  zone,	  or	  appointed	  village	  guards.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  research,	  the	  village	  was	  a	  local	  pariah:	  residents	  were	  persecuted	  by	  the	  forest	  service	  and	  condemned	  by	  rural	  councilors.	  Mansour	  Diagne,	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  resident	  of	  Niakadola,	  described	  the	  inequity	  of	  local	  environmental	  regulation:	  PAGERNA.	   They	   enforced	   the	   domain	   law60	  here.	   They	  want	   to	   protect	   the	  bush	   and	   not	   let	   anyone	   enter.	   It’s	  mean.	   Because	   they	   [residents	   of	   other	  villages]	  have	  salaries,	  and	  I	  only	  have	  the	  bush	  to	  live	  on.	  They	  [PAGERNA]	  gave	  some	  families	  rice	  or	  seeds.	  They	  gave	  me	  nothing,	  and	  they	  tell	  me	  to	  leave	  the	  bush	  alone.	  Niakadola	  residents	  widely	  resented	  forest	  regulation,	  and	  especially	  the	  actions	  of	  neighboring	  villages.	  Almost	  every	  year	  for	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  the	  forest	  service	  agent	  and	  president	  of	  the	  environmental	  commission	  came	  to	  the	  village	  to	  confiscate	  charcoal	  and	  fined	  resident	  charcoal-­‐makers	  as	  much	  as	  90,000	  fcfa	  (180	  dollars).	  Villagers	  also	  reported	  that	  was	  more	  difficult	  to	  negotiate	  fines	  with	  agents.	  In	  response,	  Niakadola	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Niakadola	  is	  closely	  allied	  to	  PDS,	  which	  has	  never	  won	  an	  election	  in	  the	  district.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  this	  and	  most	  other	  rural	  councils	  in	  near	  Kaolack	  are	  majority	  held	  by	  Bennoo,	  a	  coalition	  of	  parties	  including	  the	  formerly	  nationally	  dominant	  socialist	  party	  (PS).	  The	  Sine-­‐Saloum	  agricultural	  heartland	  has	  been	  a	  stronghold	  for	  PS	  since	  Independence.	  
60	  In	  connecting	  PAGERNA	  and	  the	  national	  domain	  law,	  Diagne	  underlines	  the	  legal	  basis	  of	  the	  protected	  mises	  en	  defens	  zones	  .	  Peasants	  in	  Sine-­‐Saloum	  widely	  consider	  the	  law	  illegitimate	  and	  divisive	  (see	  Galvan	  2004).	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  residents	  continued	  to	  practice	  solidarity	  among	  themselves.	  They	  covered	  for	  neighbors	  accused	  of	  tree	  cutting,	  and	  attempted	  to	  intervene	  on	  one	  another’s	  behalf	  when	  someone	  was	  being	  sanctioned.	  But	  the	  solidarity	  that	  once	  tied	  Niakadola	  to	  other	  villages	  had	  largely	  dissolved.	  The	  everyday	  strategies	  of	  resistance	  they	  had	  formerly	  used	  to	  escape	  centralized	  regulations	  were	  less	  effective	  now	  that	  neighboring	  villages	  were	  protecting	  areas	  of	  forest	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  collaborate	  with	  foresters.	  Thus,	  under	  intimate	  government,	  residents	  of	  villages	  like	  Niakadola	  find	  themselves	  monitored	  by	  neighbors,	  fined	  by	  foresters,	  and	  undermined	  by	  environmental	  commitments.	  Reduced	  access	  represents	  a	  further	  marginalization	  of	  a	  group	  already	  deeply	  excluded.	  An	  elder	  in	  Niakodola	  underlined	  their	  position:	  “	  Someone	  who	  has	  nothing	  –	  if	  you	  ban	  him	  from	  the	  bush,	  you’ve	  killed	  him…	  If	  you	  have	  nothing	  and	  they	  protect	  the	  bush,	  you’re	  dead.”	  To	  suggest	  that	  Kaolack	  residents	  traded	  solidarity	  for	  environmentalism	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  everyone	  became	  an	  environmental	  activist	  and	  an	  enforcer	  of	  environmental	  restrictions.	  Instead,	  it	  means	  that	  the	  relationships	  among	  environmental	  activists,	  rural	  councilors,	  forest	  service	  agents,	  and	  acquiescers	  made	  environmentalism	  a	  widely	  unchallenged	  discourse,	  and	  one	  that	  compels	  residents	  more	  than	  inter-­‐village	  rural	  solidarities.	  Although	  some	  residents	  did	  not	  participate	  directly	  in	  monitoring	  and	  fining	  their	  neighbors,	  these	  acquiescers’	  self-­‐monitoring	  and	  refusal	  to	  cover	  for	  other	  residents	  strengthened	  the	  regime	  of	  intimate	  government;	  paradoxically,	  acquiescence	  is	  a	  form	  of	  participation	  in	  intimate	  government.	  One	  result	  of	  intimate	  government	  and	  stronger	  regulation	  was	  a	  crackdown	  on	  those	  residents	  least	  able	  to	  sustain	  it.	  	  
Afterward: Intimate Government Gone Viral 
Today,	  intimate	  government	  has	  gone	  viral	  in	  Senegal.	  The	  model	  of	  community-­‐based	  management	  developed	  by	  PAGERNA	  is	  being	  propagated	  by	  development	  projects	  with	  the	  support	  of	  forest	  service	  administrators,	  and	  the	  local	  convention	  approach	  stands	  to	  be	  recognized	  in	  the	  upcoming	  revision	  of	  the	  forest	  code	  (Ribot	  2009b).	  The	  forest	  service	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  administration	  thus	  moved	  from	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  the	  local	  conventions	  in	  the	  1990s,	  to	  rhetorical	  support	  today.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  just	  centralized	  authorities,	  but	  also	  local	  ones,	  that	  support	  community-­‐based	  management.	  In	  study	  districts,	  villages	  that	  were	  never	  involved	  with	  PAGERNA	  have	  petitioned	  rural	  councils	  to	  designate	  protected	  areas	  in	  their	  own	  areas.	  Similarly,	  in	  neighboring	  districts,	  rural	  councilors	  are	  seeking	  NGO	  support	  to	  bring	  the	  ‘PAGERNA	  approach	  to	  our	  area.’	  What	  is	  revealed	  by	  this	  widespread	  interest	  in	  the	  approach	  that	  produced	  intimate	  government	  of	  forests	  in	  Kaolack?	  First,	  it	  shows	  that	  forest	  service	  administrators	  recognize	  that	  changes	  they	  once	  believed	  threatened	  their	  agency’s	  prerogatives	  have	  helped	  them	  to	  achieve	  certain	  objectives:	  stricter,	  more	  effective	  enforcement	  at	  low	  cost.	  Indeed,	  PAGERNA	  itself	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  success	  on	  these	  terms	  by	  presenting	  data	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  land	  reforested	  through	  natural	  regeneration	  in	  village	  protected	  zones.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  interest	  on	  the	  part	  of	  rural	  councils	  and	  village	  leaders	  can	  be	  read	  as	  pursuit	  of	  development	  project	  activities	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  they	  provide.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  should	  dismiss	  this	  interest.	  As	  we	  saw,	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  new	  practices	  of	  regulation	  often	  do	  so	  in	  pursuit	  of	  short-­‐term	  interests.	  Recognizing	  short-­‐term	  interests	  in	  environmental	  protection	  can	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  subjectivities.	  Intimate	  government	  going	  viral	  suggests	  the	  continued	  relevance	  of	  environmentality	  to	  understanding	  shifting	  governance	  of	  forests	  in	  Senegal	  and	  elsewhere.	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6. CONCLUSION 
The	  emergence	  of	  intimate	  government	  in	  Kaolack	  illustrates	  the	  usefulness	  of	  an	  environmentality	  framework	  –	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  subject	  formation	  in	  particular	  –	  to	  understanding	  changes	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  the	  incorporation	  of	  communities	  into	  management.	  This	  concluding	  chapter	  briefly	  explores	  the	  wider	  contributions	  of	  the	  environmentality	  approach.	  It	  focuses	  on	  how	  environmentality	  can	  be	  deployed	  as	  a	  middle	  ground	  analysis	  for	  understanding	  multiple	  institutional,	  normative,	  and	  ideational	  changes.	  Examining	  subjectivities	  need	  not	  imply	  compressing	  the	  field	  of	  study	  to	  singular	  outcomes	  or	  totalizing	  governmental	  projects.	  Instead,	  attention	  to	  subjectivities	  can	  reveal	  multiple	  outcomes	  that	  are	  differentiated	  across	  social	  groups	  and	  highlight	  the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  ideological	  and	  institutional	  domains.	  Relatively	  few	  studies	  of	  natural	  resource	  governance	  explicitly	  attend	  to	  subject	  formation,	  or	  have	  considered	  the	  links	  between	  short-­‐term	  policies	  and	  projects	  and	  rural	  people’s	  desires,	  identities,	  and	  orientations	  towards	  resource	  management	  (see	  Agrawal	  2005a,	  2005b;	  Birkenholtz	  2009;	  Mawdsley	  2009).	  At	  a	  general	  level,	  it	  is	  often	  assumed	  that	  when	  people	  engage	  with	  the	  practices	  and	  ideologies	  of	  environmental	  management,	  they	  do	  so	  opportunistically	  and	  based	  on	  prior	  and	  fixed	  interests.	  As	  a	  corollary,	  the	  impacts	  of	  policies	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  temporary	  or,	  where	  they	  are	  lasting,	  to	  serve	  separate	  and	  ulterior	  purposes,	  such	  as	  when	  elites	  appropriate	  environmental	  discourses	  and	  institutions	  to	  consolidate	  their	  control	  of	  resources.	  Clearly,	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  was	  not	  the	  case	  following	  PAGERNA’s	  intervention	  in	  Kaolack.	  How	  then,	  does	  attention	  to	  subjectivities	  strengthen	  analyses	  of	  the	  longer-­‐term	  implications	  of	  resource	  management	  policies,	  such	  as	  trends	  towards	  community-­‐based	  management?	  First,	  subjectivities	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  sustaining	  and	  shaping	  regimes	  of	  practice	  that	  persist	  after	  interventions.	  In	  Kaolack,	  it	  was	  the	  actions	  of	  activists	  –	  influenced	  by	  new	  understandings	  of	  self-­‐interest	  –	  that	  brought	  about	  and	  sustained	  an	  intimate	  regime	  of	  forest	  regulation.	  Subjectivities	  are	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  persistence	  of	  this	  regime,	  since	  none	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  anticipated	  or	  directed	  intimate	  government;	  it	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  negotiations	  among	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  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reconfigured	  interests.	  Secondly,	  attention	  to	  subjectivities	  sheds	  light	  on	  institutional	  change.	  In	  addition	  to	  work	  on	  environmentality,	  the	  emerging	  literature	  on	  institutional	  syncretism	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  subjectivities	  and	  institutional	  forms	  are	  mutually	  constituted	  and	  subject	  to	  continuous	  comparison,	  mixing,	  and	  alteration	  (Galvan	  2004,	  Galvan	  and	  Sil	  2007a).	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  institutions	  is	  formed	  in	  part	  through	  the	  values,	  historical	  memories,	  and	  commitments	  of	  different	  constituencies.	  Institutional	  legitimacy	  may	  be	  especially	  important	  where	  authority	  is	  contested	  and	  split	  among	  multiple	  institutions	  (Ribot	  et	  al	  2008).	  Subjectivities	  enter	  into	  institution-­‐constituent	  interactions	  that	  can	  lead	  towards	  -­‐	  or	  away	  from	  –	  the	  construction	  of	  downward	  accountability	  (Chhatre	  2008).	  Finally,	  subject	  formation	  may	  produce	  new	  kinds	  of	  actors	  and	  actions	  in	  local	  politics.	  In	  Kaolack,	  environmental	  activists	  have	  acquired	  standing	  as	  local	  authorities,	  through	  their	  commitment	  to	  environmentalist	  values,	  and	  their	  subsequent	  role	  in	  regulating	  resource	  use.	  This	  position	  has	  contributed	  to	  reconfiguring	  relations	  among	  village	  authorities,	  rural	  councils,	  and	  state	  administrative	  institutions	  like	  the	  forest	  service.	  Related	  results	  have	  emerged	  from	  the	  body	  of	  research	  on	  development	  brokers,	  in	  which	  development	  projects	  produce	  new	  actors	  who	  go	  on	  to	  shape	  local	  politics	  (Blundo	  1995,	  Biershenk	  et	  al	  2000,	  Lewis	  and	  Mosse	  2006).	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  that	  we	  can	  predict	  or	  generalize	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  emerge	  from	  development	  interventions	  and	  environmental	  policies.	  However,	  understanding	  the	  full	  implications	  of	  interventions	  requires	  accounting	  for	  these	  people	  and	  their	  actions	  well	  beyond	  the	  project	  life	  cycle.	  The	  purpose	  of	  drawing	  attention	  to	  subject	  formation	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  devolution	  and	  participation	  in	  regulatory	  practices	  lead	  to	  a	  unitary	  outcome	  or	  affect	  all	  people	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Kaolack	  intimate	  government	  was	  a	  heterogeneous	  and	  incomplete	  project	  that	  touched	  the	  lives	  of	  residents	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  The	  subjects	  who	  regulated	  themselves	  (and	  others),	  and	  who	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  past	  work	  on	  environmentality,	  form	  a	  critical	  piece	  of	  this	  project,	  but	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  This	  thesis	  attends	  to	  multiple	  subjectivities	  and	  multiple	  mechanisms	  of	  rule	  and	  provides	  an	  admittedly	  schematic	  view	  of	  these	  patterns	  by	  categorizing	  residents	  as	  activists,	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  acquiescers,	  and	  resistors	  to	  forest	  regulation.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  schematic	  is	  not	  to	  introduce	  a	  static	  dimension	  of	  identity	  on	  top	  of	  existing	  ones,	  but	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  connection	  between	  practices,	  subjectivities,	  and	  a	  governance	  regime.	  The	  people	  I	  describe	  as	  environmental	  activists	  most	  clearly	  embodied	  Agrawal’s	  use	  of	  environmental	  subjectivities.	  As	  Agrawal	  describes	  in	  detail,	  these	  residents	  were	  implicated	  in	  a	  particular	  mechanism	  of	  rule:	  they	  were	  ruled	  through	  what	  we	  might	  describe	  as	  government	  through	  desires.	  The	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  environmentality	  framework	  by	  identifying	  a	  second	  category	  of	  person	  who	  was	  equally	  part	  of	  intimate	  government:	  people	  I	  labeled	  acquiescers.	  Although	  their	  desires	  were	  never	  made	  to	  serve	  the	  project	  of	  governing	  forests	  and	  forest	  users,	  acquiescers	  were	  nonetheless	  incorporated	  into	  intimate	  government.	  Community	  monitoring	  brought	  to	  bear	  pressures	  to	  comply,	  channeled	  through	  residents’	  pre-­‐existing	  connections	  with	  village	  authorities	  and	  neighbors.	  I	  concur	  with	  Agrawal	  that	  Foucault’s	  metaphor	  of	  the	  panopticon	  is	  unsatisfying	  in	  this	  context	  (Agrawal	  2005a	  p.	  93,	  Foucault	  1977).	  Nonetheless,	  community	  pressures	  embody	  a	  second	  mechanism	  of	  rule,	  which	  might	  be	  called	  government	  through	  monitoring.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  a	  third	  category	  of	  person,	  to	  which	  Agrawal	  pays	  less	  attention:	  those	  who	  refused	  to	  be	  ruled.61	  Through	  everyday	  practices	  and	  peasant	  ideology,	  these	  residents	  continued	  to	  resist	  forest	  regulation	  and	  assert	  their	  right	  to	  access	  resources	  and	  markets.	  Under	  intimate	  government,	  more	  dispersed,	  strict,	  and	  consistent	  regulation	  restricted	  their	  actions,	  but	  did	  not	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  of	  resistance.	  Rule	  of	  these	  residents	  remained	  based	  on	  coercive	  and	  punitive	  measures.	  Thus,	  while	  intimate	  government	  may	  be	  “more	  modulated	  but	  less	  visible,	  more	  autonomous	  but	  more	  continuous,	  more	  precise	  and…	  more	  humane”	  (Agrawal	  2005a,	  p.	  93)	  when	  compared	  with	  centralized	  rule,	  but	  it	  remains	  an	  incomplete	  project.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  This	  is	  intended	  as	  a	  passing	  allusion	  to	  James	  C.	  Scott’s	  The	  Art	  of	  Not	  Being	  Governed,	  without	  plunging	  into	  its	  analytical	  points.	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  When	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  incomplete	  and	  heterogeneous,	  environmentality	  allows	  a	  flexible	  analysis	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  governance	  changes,	  such	  as	  the	  incorporation	  of	  communities	  into	  natural	  resource	  management.	  In	  advocating	  for	  such	  an	  approach,	  my	  purpose	  has	  not	  been	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  subjectivities	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  rule	  that	  emerged	  in	  Kaolack	  will	  be	  mirrored	  elsewhere.	  Nor	  do	  I	  mean	  that	  divisions	  between	  resistance	  and	  rule	  or	  between	  state	  and	  community	  authority	  will	  occur	  along	  the	  same	  axes.	  Instead,	  I	  propose	  that	  to	  understand	  longer-­‐term	  implications	  of	  projects	  and	  policies,	  we	  must	  attend	  to	  the	  multiple	  ways	  they	  shape	  people’s	  actions,	  commitments,	  and	  identities,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  shape	  people	  incompletely.	  These	  outcomes	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  predict	  and	  do	  not	  result	  straightforwardly	  from	  the	  self-­‐conscious	  motivations	  of	  the	  actors	  involved.	  The	  degrees	  to	  which	  particular	  changes	  –	  such	  as	  lasting	  community	  involvement	  in	  regulating	  forests	  –	  enhance	  or	  diminish	  values	  such	  as	  democratic	  representativeness,	  social	  equity,	  and	  resource	  sustainability	  will	  be	  variable	  and	  uncertain.	  Whether	  or	  not	  environmentality	  and	  subject	  formation	  allow	  us	  to	  use	  “Foucault	  as	  a	  policy	  tool,”62	  they	  complicate	  the	  problem	  substantially.	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  approach	  lies	  in	  revealing	  how	  practices,	  consciousness,	  and	  forms	  of	  rule	  are	  mutually	  constituted	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  I	  thank	  Jesse	  C.	  Ribot	  for	  suggesting	  this	  phrase.	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TABLES AND FIGURES 
	  
Figure	  1	  
The	  location	  of	  study	  area	  in	  Senegal.	  The	  dark	  border	  indicates	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  former	  Fatick	  
and	  Kaolack	  Regions.	  (Today	  this	  area	  is	  split	  among	  three	  regions.)	  The	  shaded	  oval	  indicates	  
the	  approximate	  extent	  of	  the	  Peanut	  Basin.	  (adapted	  from	  Agence	  National	  de	  la	  Statistique	  et	  
de	  la	  Démographie,	  République	  du	  Sénégal.)	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Respondent Count 
chiefs & elders 14 
farmers 9 
forest guards 16 
herders 8 
rural councilors 8 
women 24 
forestry administrators 5 
local forestry agents 4 
project staff 9 
	  
Table	  1	  
Distribution	  of	  the	  97	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  among	  types	  of	  respondents.	  In	  addition	  to	  
formal	  interviews,	  the	  author	  conducted	  informal	  observations	  and	  discussions.	  
	  
	  
Rule-­‐breaker	   count	  
	  
Infraction	  Type	   count	  
Man	  (other	  village)	   13	  
	  
Cutting	  tree	   9	  
Woman	  (same	  village)	   1	  
	  
Lopping	  branches	   5	  
Woman	  (other	  village)	   1	  
	  
Picking	  fruit	   0	  
Herder	   2	  
	  
Cutting	  firewood	   3	  
Unknown	   1	  
	  
Unknown	   1	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Apprehender	   count	  
	  
Was	  the	  forest	  agent	  involved?	   count	  
Man	   4	  
	  
No	   6	  
Woman	   4	  
	  
Yes	   10	  
Village	  guard	   6	  
	  
Rule-­‐breaker	  escaped	   1	  
Unknown	   4	  
	  
Unknown	   1	  
	  
Table	  2	  
Reported	  village	  rule-­‐breaking	  in	  one	  rural	  community,	  over	  approximately	  the	  period	  2006-­‐
2010.	  Overall,	  respondents	  reported	  18	  infractions	  across	  10	  villages.	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Infraction Type count average fine (fcfa) 
Cutting tree 3 25,000 
Lopping branches 2 21,000 
Illegal sale 1 15,000 
	  
Table	  3	  
Forest	  code	  infractions	  recorded	  in	  log	  book	  of	  the	  forest	  service	  agent	  for	  the	  same	  rural	  
community	  as	  above,	  covering	  the	  period	  2009-­‐10.	  
